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Abstract 
The main goal of this thesis is to create understanding on how the EU sees the 
events in Ukraine and creates itself through the articulation of a self and other. This 
official discourse, articulated through the readings of EU political elite, is seen as 
hegemonic. Discourses radically opposing the official discourses – viewed as counter-
hegemonic discourses – are analysed to see how these hegemonic views are challenged 
by political parties carrying an anti-European theme. To achieve this a poststructuralist 
approach to discourse, language and identity is adopted. The theoretical framework is 
based on the works of Lene Hansen, Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe.  
For the analysis of the official discourses, key texts produced by EU political 
leaders were selected. The analysis of the hegemonic discourse was conducted through a 
creation of a timeline around key events – the beginning of protests of Maidan, the 
annexation of Crimea and the outset of violent clashes in the Eastern Ukraine. The 
oppositional or counter-hegemony discourses will be analysed through the readings of 
texts produced by two far-right political parties – Jobbik in Hungary and British National 
Party in the UK. 
The results of the analysis show that by the official discourse, the events in Ukraine, 
especially the Maidan protests, are depicted in a way as to offer legitimacy for the EU 
and the values underpinning it. At the same time these events, and the annexation of 
Crimea in special, are seen as threat to the very idea of Europe. Within the official 
discourse, the identity of the EU is created through a linking to the values underpinning 
the Union and though a differentiation from Russia. The ‘degree of otherness’ of Russia 
changes during the unfolding of the events and becomes more negative after the 
annexation of Crimea. 
While Europe was seen to stand for peace, mutual prosperity and stability, Russia 
is seen as aggressive, self-interested and not respective of international laws. The official 
discourse depicts Russia as being stuck in the outdated Cold War mentality of bloc against 
bloc and the logic of spheres of influence thus opposing itself to the Union as a rival. It is 
precisely this world view that is strongly rejected by the official discourse. 
As for the counter-hegemonic discourses, as was to be expected, both were very 
similar in the way in which they viewed Europe, Russia and the events in Ukraine and 
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were radically different from the official discourse. The events in Maidan are not linked 
to a general desire of the Ukrainian people for European values and way of life but are 
seen as orchestrated by the US. The main negative other for the counter-hegemonic 
discourses is the US and not Russia, the latter is viewed as a role model. Neither of the 
two political parties has much good to say about the EU describing it as an imperialistic 
colonizer doing the bidding of the US. It should also be mentioned that even though the 
two parties expressed rather similar discourses, the BNP was in several aspects more 
radical than Jobbik.  
The analysis conducted in the thesis shows that the counter-hegemonic discourses 
do try to offer a radically different meaning to the idea of Europe and to the events in 
Ukraine (and how they are linked). The findings of the comparative analysis stretch far 
beyond the discourses emanated from the two parties and key speakers of the EU.  The 
conclusions are illustrative of deep splits within the European identity, which in current 
times is faced with many challenges both from within and out, of which the events in 
Ukraine are just one of the catalysts. 
Keywords: hegemony, counter-hegemony, Ukraine, post-structuralism, the European 
Union, identity, discourse theory, key events  
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Introduction 
 
Ukraine has been among the foreign policy priorities of European politics for well 
over a year - ever since the Euromaidan protests of 2013 which started when the (then 
president) Yanukovych decided not to sign the long prepared association and the deep 
and comprehensive free trade area (DCFTA) agreements with the EU in the Vilnius 
summit. From peaceful protest to violent clashes and civilian casualties – the events in 
Ukraine have kept unravelling with an unexpected speed and direction. With the removal 
from power of Yanukovych and the taking of Crimea by Russia, the EU found itself faced 
with a reality unlike which had not been seen for decades. Events have quite rapidly 
evolved into an armed conflict within (or right at) the boarders of Europe. 
The foreign policy of Europe and the actual policies adopted play a crucial role in 
not only for the present and future of Ukraine but for the Union itself. The turn of events 
in Ukraine possesses a challenge to the European identity and the essence of EU by 
forcing it to ask itself what its role should be in the light of what being European 
represents and what the Ukrainian events constitute for the idea and future of Europe. The 
EU was created as a peace project meant to unite European countries in a land of 
prosperity and stability. However, the Union is in crisis and threatened from within by 
the rise of the popularity of political parties that are often extremely anti-European. 
It is for these reasons that this thesis takes an analytical look at the European 
discourses surrounding the events in Ukraine. The reason for doing this is to understand 
the various discursive approaches to questions of European identity that have risen in the 
light of the Ukrainian events. Questions such as what is Europe and what does it mean to 
be European? The main goal of the thesis is to create understanding on how the EU sees 
the events in Ukraine and itself through a study of its discourse regarding the events in 
Ukraine. Discourses radically opposing it are analysed to see how these views are 
challenged by political parties carrying an anti-European theme. The following questions 
will be asked: 
1. What is the official discourse of the EU surrounding the events in Ukraine – how 
is the EU and its role in the Ukrainian events seen? What kind of identity is created 
for Europe? 
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2. What are the oppositional/anti-hegemony discourses on Ukraine expressed by far-
right political parties within the member states of the EU? What are their common 
denominators – how much and in which way do they differ? 
3. Has the discourse (official) evolved in any way throughout the unfolding of the 
Ukrainian events?  
 
To achieve this a poststructuralist approach to discourse, language and identity is 
adopted. The theoretical framework will be based on the works of Lene Hansen, Ernesto 
Laclau and Chantal Mouffe. The poststructuralist approach makes no differentiation 
between discursive and the material but sees all our access to reality as possible only 
though language. Discourses are viewed as playing a major role in the production and 
development of identities. The latter are viewed as discursive, political, relational and 
social. Thus discourses always articulate a ‘self’ and an ‘other’. The degree of 
differentiation between the self and the other may vary. In addition, poststructuralist 
approach views identity and foreign policy as mutually constitutive and strongly linked. 
Discourses are seen to be in constant struggle to fix meaning in their own way thus 
producing different identify and self/other formations. 
Hegemony is the expansion of a discourse or set of discourses into a dominant 
horizon of social orientation and action. (Torfing, 1999: 101) The official discourse 
expressed by the political leaders of the will be seen as hegemonic. This hegemonic 
discourse and its construction of the events in Ukraine and European identity will be seen 
as challenged by counter-hegemony disocurses. These counter-hegemony discourses are 
seen as expressing radically different views of the Ukrainian crisis and EUs role within it 
from those of the official discourse. These discourses are in constant struggle with the 
official discourse in trying ascribe meaning to events in their own way and thus they 
produce strongly different readings of facts and events.  
The official hegemonic discourse will be based on the analysis of speeches and 
statements made by most prominent EU officials – the president of the European 
Commission, the Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy, 
the president of the European Council and the High Representative of the Union for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy since the best source for EU classical discourses is in 
Brussels.  
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The official discourses will also be analysed for discursive change. For this a 
temporal layout will be adopted through the use of key events. Key events are moments 
in which important facts manifest themselves thus bringing about changes in foreign 
policies and identity constructions. The key events around which the timeline will be built 
are:  the beginning of protests on the Maidan square, the annexation of Crimea and the 
outset of armed fighting in the Eastern Ukraine.   
Counter-hegemonic discourses will be interpreted through the use of the discourses 
of two far-right political parties, within the EU member states which by nature are EU 
critical. The two political parties selected the Jobbik from Hungary and the British 
National Party (BNP) in the UK. These discourses are seen as anti-hegemony discourses 
that are radically different from the official discourse of the Union. The hope is to identify 
the areas in which these anti-hegemony discourses oppose to the EU in both their ciew of 
the events in Ukraine and subsequent construction of European identity and self/other 
dimensions.  
The first chapter will set the theoretical framework of the thesis. As was mentioned 
above, this thesis is based on a poststructuralist approach to discourse analysis. Thus the 
main ideas of post-structuralism will be explained, with emphasis being put on the 
understanding of the relationship between discourses, languages and identities. In 
addition it introduces the basics of Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory and its most 
important concepts.  
The second chapter begins with the description of the methodology adopted in the 
thesis and is followed by the account of textual materials chosen for official discourse 
analysis. Main emphasis is put on the actual analysis of the official discourse – in three 
stages, which are determined by key events previously described. Chapter ends with short 
conclusions drawn from the analysis of the official discourse.  
The third chapter begins by explaining the choice of textual material for the Jobbik 
discourse, followed by the analysis of the discourse regarding the events in Ukraine. The 
same logic is observed regarding the second half of the chapter, in which the background 
to the British National Party will be given and choice of textual material analysed will be 
provided followed by the actual analysis of the discourse. Here too, the chapter will end 
with the conclusions of the main findings. The overall findings of the thesis will be 
brought out in the final conclusions.  
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Theoretical background 
 
IR theories and post-structuralism  
 
In poststructuralist perspective, foreign policy is understood as a discursive practice 
and thus it is argued that foreign policy discourses articulate and intertwine material 
factors and ideas to such an extent that they cannot be separated from each other. 
Discourses are viewed as inherently social due to the fact that, when attempting to 
institutionalize their understanding of the identities and policy options at stake, the policy 
makers address both the opposition and the wider public. The poststructuralist approach 
to identity sets it apart from liberal and constructivist studies of ideas as a variable in 
foreign policy analysis. To poststructuralists, identity is not something that can be had 
independently of the discursive practices. (Hansen 2006:1) Post-structuralism can be 
drawn to show that identities matter for foreign policy and that it is possible to study them 
systematically by adopting a theory of discourse. (Hansen 2006:5) 
What ultimately sets posts-structuralism apart from constructivism in IR studies is 
the latter’s inclination to possibly stable situations and a lesser interest in language as 
such, while post-structuralism views language as paradoxical and a system with its own 
oddities and meaning, ever fragile and contingent. (Waever 2001:23) Post-structuralism 
approaches language as a system of meaning while mainstream IR (including mainstream 
constructivism) sees it more as a way of representing external reality. (Waever 2001:24) 
Language is seen as constitutive for what is brought into being and as social and political. 
It is an inherently unstable system of signs that generate meaning through a simultaneous 
construction of identity and difference. (Hansen 2006:17) 
Social constructivism comprises  a range of new theories about culture and society, 
with discourse analysis being one of them (and the one most widely used). (Jorgensen 
and Phillips 2002:4) Jorgensen and Phillips bring out four premises which are shared by 
all social constructivist approaches. Firstly, they all take a critical approach to taken-for-
granted knowledge. Our representations of the world are not reflections of the reality but 
rather products of the way we categorize the world. Secondly, they state that our 
knowledge and view of the world is historically and culturally specific and a contingent 
product of interchanges among people. Thirdly, they maintain that our knowledge and 
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understanding of the world is created through social interaction. And lastly, they state that 
within a particular understanding of the world, some actions become natural while others 
become unthinkable. (Jorgensen and Phillips 2002:5-6) 
Constructivism helps the modern IR gain a more complete picture of what makes 
the world hang together. (Checkel 2004:230) Checkel distinguishes between three 
variants of constructivism: conventional, interpretive and critical/radical variants. The 
first of these – conventional constructivism – examines the role of norms and identities 
in shaping international political outcomes with process-tracing case study as a 
methodological starting point. Interpretative constructivists are more committed to a 
deeply inductive research strategy that targets the reconstruction of state/agent identity 
and with methods encompassing a variety of discourse-theoretic methods. Critical 
scholars add a normative dimension by probing the researcher’s own implication in the 
reproduction of the identities and the world he/she is studying. Discourse-theoretical 
methods are again used with an emphasis on the power and domination inherent in 
language. (Checkel 2004:230-231)  
To constructivists, reality is a product of social interaction (Berenskoetter 
2011:648) and it has the objective of inquiring how “we construct the world we know in 
a world we do not”. (Berenskoetter 2011:649) The study of identity formation and its 
impact on international politics is central to constructivist work. Humans are capable of 
self-reflection and are able to ask how they, both as individuals and as collectives, come 
to establish a sense of Self and what consequences this has on their behaviour. 
(Berenskoetter 2011: 649) Neither are scholars as researchers of these processes detached 
observers recording objective facts, but agents partaking in the creation of knowledge 
and, hence, in what we call reality. (Berenskoetter 2011:649) 
 
What is discourse and discourse analysis? 
 
The concept of discourse is a contested one - it is used often but with various 
meanings depending on different contexts and approaches. There is no clear consensus, 
among the series of interdisciplinary approaches that engage in discourse analysis, as to 
what exactly discourses are or how they should be studied (Jorgensen and Phillips 
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2002:1). It is for this reason that I will dwell upon the various understandings and 
interpretations of ´these aspects.  
Discourse is the space in which intersubjective meaning is created, sustained, 
transformed and becomes constitutive of social reality. More simply said, it is the space 
in which humans make sense of the material world and attach meaning to it and where 
representations of the world manifest themselves. (Holzscheiter 2013:3) Jorgensen and 
Phillips propose a simplified preliminary definition of a discourse as a particular way of 
talking about and understanding the world (or an aspect of it). (Jorgensen and Phillips 
2002:1) There are many different approaches to discourse analysis, with none of them 
being uniquely “right”- different approaches fit different issues and questions better or 
worse than others. (Gee 2011:10) 
Both of the previously mentioned understandings of discourse carry within 
themselves the importance of language for discourses. This is so because a starting point 
for all discourse analytical approaches is the structuralist and poststructuralist linguistic 
philosophy claim that all our access to reality is always through language. (Jorgensen and 
Phillips 2002:8) The emphasized role of language is what unites various approaches of 
discourse analysis. They all share the general idea that language is structured according 
to different patterns that people utterances follow when they take part in different domains 
of social life. It is these patterns that discourse analysis focuses on. (Jorgensen and 
Phillips 2002:1) Discourse analysis is the study of language-in-use1 (Gee 2011:8) and it 
engages with meaning and the linguistic and communicative processes through which 
social reality is constructed. (Holzscheiter 2013:3) There are many kinds of discourse 
theory which vary in their understanding of discourse and of the imbrication of language 
and political power struggles. (Torfing 2004:1)  
Rising from the previous it is believed that humans are thus not able to relate to the 
material world without discourse. This is never the less to mean than the material world 
does not exist outside discourse – it just can’t be accessed by humans without discourse. 
(Holzscheiter 2013:3) In addition, another often shared idea is that the language we use 
                                                          
1 Language in use is about saying, doing and being. By saying, doing and being, certain “games” or 
“practices” are enacted, which, in turn, give meaning to our saying, doing and being. These “games” or 
“practices” always belong to social groups, cultures or institutions and by enacting them we also sustain 
these social groups, cultures and institutions. (Gee 2011:16)  
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does not reflect our world, identities and social relations in a neutral manner. Rather, it 
plays an active role in both creating and changing them. (Jorgensen and Phillips 2002:1) 
Discourses are rather a framing of meaning and lenses of interpretation, than objective 
historical truths. (Hansen 2006:7) Different approaches to discourse analysis vary both 
on their understanding of the exact demarcation of the discursive and the material and on 
the way in which they view and approach language. Some look at the content of the 
language being used while others pay more attention to the structure of language and how 
this structure functions to make meaning in specific contexts. (Gee 2011:8) Relationship 
between discourses and language will be depicted in more detail in the coming chapter. 
 
Specifics of Discourse analysis 
 
A study of discourse asks for the social and political effects of using a certain kind 
of vocabulary on the one hand and the productive effects of a certain construction of 
reality on the agency, identity of individuals and groups. Thus discourse analysis 
examines what is achieved by using particular discursive repertoires and strategies and 
which dimensions of reality and options for political action are included and excluded by 
specific representations of reality. (Holzscheiter 2013:3)  
Discourses organize knowledge systematically and thus they limit the options of 
what can be said and what not. Discourse analysis looks for the rules that govern what 
can and cannot be said, arguing, that discourse forms a system made up of a layered 
constellation of key concepts. (Waever 2001:28) There are certain arguments and things 
that can sound sensible or powerful at a certain time period or place but are absurd at 
others. (Waever 2001:28) Discourses are made of statements and the unity and coherence 
of a discourse is made by the regularities exhibited by the relations between different 
statements. (Waever 2001:28) Rules govern the formation of statements, but these rules 
can't be seen independently of the statements themselves. (Waever 2001:28-29) 
Discourse analysis should zoom in on discourse and the structures that organize it 
thus delivering coherent, well-structured constraints on foreign policy. (Waever 2001:28) 
Structures within discourse condition possible policies and overall policy must hold a 
definite relationship to discursive structures. (Waever 2001:27) Discourse analysis 
16 
 
approaches begin by identifying the discourses within which interactions take place in a 
particular issue-area of international politics. (Epstein 2010:342) Politically 
contextualized discourse analysis combines the analysis of how texts seek to create 
stability with the analysis of whether these constructions are being challenged within the 
larger public and political domain. (Hansen 2006:30) 
Discourse analysis works with texts; it does not try to uncover the actors’ hidden 
agendas, secret motives or their true thoughts. When analysing discourse, one works with 
public texts and uses them for what they are, not as indicators of something else. What 
interests the researcher are the shared codes which are used when actors relate to each 
other, not what the individual decision makers really believe or what the shared beliefs 
among a population are. (Waever 2001:26-27) It is the discourse itself that is the object 
of analysis. The analyst must work with what has actually been said or written, exploring 
patterns in and across the statements and identifying the social consequences of different 
discursive representations of reality. (Jorgensen and Phillips 2002:21) 
Discourses have no definite and permanent boundaries since people are always 
creating new ones, changing the old ones, and contesting and pushing the boundaries of 
current discourses. (Gee 2011:37) Discourse theory doesn’t see the conditions of 
possibility as inherent to the human mind, but takes them to be a structural feature of the 
contingently constructed discourses. Thus discourse theory focuses on the historical 
formation of the discursive conditions of social being not on observable facts or deep 
meanings. (Torfing 2004:10)  
In doing discourse analysis we gain knowledge about a context in which a piece of 
language has been used and use this information to form hypotheses about what that piece 
of language means and is doing. On the other hand the piece of language is closely studied 
and we ask what we can learn about the context in which the language was used and how 
that context was constructed (interpreted) by the speaker or writer and listener(s) or 
reader(s). (Gee 2011:20) 
Discourse scholarship cannot agree on any best way to study international politics 
from a discursive perspective – discourse analytical approaches should be tailored to the 
empirical subjects studied rather than vice versa. However, though this is legitimate, it 
does not imply that the analyst needn’t uncover his or her analytical procedures. All 
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discourse studies should be replicable and achieve a greater potential for generalization 
through comparison between different cases. (Holzscheiter 2013:18) 
 
Classification of approaches to discourse analysis 
 
Torfing provides a classification of discourse analysis into three generations. The 
first generation defines discourse in the narrow linguistic sense of a textual unit which is 
larger than a sentence and thus focuses on the semantic aspects of spoken or written text. 
(Torfing 2004:6) The second generation sees discourse in a broader way by not restricting 
it to written or spoken language but by extending it to a wider set of social practices. 
Critical discourse analysis (CDA) is seen to belong to this generation. CDA is developed 
mostly by Norman Fairclough and is inspired by the works of Michael Foucault. The II 
generation also sees discursive practices as ideological – social classes and ethnic groups 
produce ideological discourses in order to maintain their hegemonic power, or to establish 
a counter-hegemony.  Power and discourse are seen as mutually constitutive, meaning we 
can’t have one without the other, since discourse regulates actions by means of shaping 
the social actors identities, capacities, and relations of subordination. (Torfing 2004:7-8)  
The third generation further extends the notion of discourse to cover all social 
phenomena. Discourse no longer refers to a particular part of the social system but is 
coterminous with the social and social meaning becomes partially fixed in and through 
discourse. The third generation is unified by a broad understanding of discourse as a 
relational system of signifying practices that is produced through historical and political 
interventions. The most distinguished third generation scholars are Ernesto Laclau and 
Chantal Mouffe, who, define discourse as the historically variable conditions of 
possibility of what we say, think, imagine, and do. Unlike the II generation they abandon 
the distinction between discursive and non-discursive thus claiming that discourse is co-
extensive with the social. (Torfing 2004:8-9) Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory is a 
poststructuralist theory, which has its starting point in the idea, that discourse constructs 
the social world of meaning which can never be permanently fixed. (Jorgensen and 
Phillips 2002:6) 
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Both the II (Critical Discourse Analysis) and the III (Laclau and Mouffe) generation 
discourse analytical approaches draw on structuralist and poststructuralist language 
theory, but they vary as to the extent to which the poststructuralist label applies. 
(Jorgensen and Phillips 2002:6) Laclau and Mouffes approach can be seen as more 
poststructuralist than Norman Faircloughs’ critical discourse analysis. (Jorgensen and 
Phillips 2002:6) 
 
Core themes in poststructuralist discourse theory 
 
Torfing summarized five core themes in poststructuralist theory based on the works 
of Laclau and Mouffe. First argument is that all forms of social practice take place against 
a background of historically specific discourses, which can be defined as relational 
systems of signification. Whatever we say, do or think is conditioned by discourse, which 
on the other hand is modified and transformed by what we are saying, thinking and doing. 
Secondly, discourse is constructed in and through hegemonic struggles that aim to 
establish a political and moral-intellectual leadership through the articulation of meaning 
and identity thus discourse is a result of political decisions. This hegemonic articulation 
of meaning and identity, according to the third argument, is intrinsically linked to the 
construction of social antagonism, which involves the exclusion of a threatening other 
that stabilizes the discursive system while, at the same time, preventing its ultimate sure. 
The fourth argument is that a stable hegemonic discourse becomes dislocated when it is 
encountered by events that it fails to explain, represent etc. Fifthly, the dislocation of the 
discursive structure means that the subject always emerges as a split subject that might 
attempt to reconstruct a full identity by means of identifying itself with the promise of 
fullness offered by other political projects. (Torfing 2004:14-17) 
 
Discourses and language 
 
As stated previously, language plays a crucial role in discourses and their analysis 
since all discourse analytical approaches share, as their starting point, the claim that our 
access to reality is always through language. (Jorgensen and Phillips 2002:8) To 
19 
 
poststructuralists, it is only through the construction in language that things are given a 
meaning and a particular identity. (Hansen 2006:18) Epstein summarizes three key 
premises regarding the relationship between language, agency and identity on which the 
discourse approach operates. First, language is effective and to speak means also to act. 
Secondly, social actors are speaking actors and third, actor behaviour is regulated by pre-
existing discourses that structure the field of possible actions. (Epstein 2010:343) What 
the discourse analysis approach studies is the way in which actors define themselves by 
stepping into a particular subject-positions carved out by discourse. (Epstein 2010:344) 
There are four points on which, according to Jorgensen and Phillips, all discourse 
analytical approaches agree to. Firstly, language is not a reflection of a pre-existing 
reality. Secondly, language is structured in patterns of discourses which, thirdly, are 
maintained and transformed in discursive practices. And lastly, the maintenance and 
transformation of the patterns should thus be explored through analysis of the specific 
context in which language is in action. (Jorgensen and Phillips 2002:12) 
Languages, as identities, are social (not a private property of the individual but a 
series of codes and conventions needed to make one comprehensible) and political (a site 
for the production and reproduction of particular subjectivities and identities while others 
are simultaneously excluded). (Hansen 2006:18) The relationship between language and 
reality is arbitrary – the world does not dictate the words with which it should be 
described. The meaning of individual signs is determined by their relation to other signs. 
(Jorgensen and Phillips 2002:10) and one element is valued over its opposite (Hansen 
2006:19)  
Meaning, being constructed though the discursive juxtaposition between a 
privileged sign on the one hand and a devalued on the other, leads to a conceptualization 
of identity in relational terms and as being constructed along two dimensions (Laclau and 
Mouffe 1985 in Hansen 2006:19) However, in poststructuralist discourse analytical 
approaches, these signs are not seen as fixed – signs still acquire their meaning by being 
different from other signs, but the signs from which they differ can change according to 
the context in which they are used. This, however, isn’t to mean that words are open to 
all meanings, just that they can’t be fixed with just one or more definitive meaning(s). 
(Jorgensen and Phillips 2002:11)  
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Language should thus be addressed from a differential understanding, according to 
which meaning is located in the differences among concepts. Language becomes a system 
and we will be able to study its structure as a separate stratum of reality. Since everything 
that includes statements about meanings has to involve an understanding of these systems 
there is a discursive element to be found in more or less anything we could find 
interesting. (Waever 2001:28) Language is an element of the social at all levels. 
Languages define certain potential and possibilities while excluding others. (Fairclough 
2003:24) 
What is important in poststructuralist view of language is that language is viewed 
always having a political dimension. To Gee all language is always “political” in a deep 
sense, when using language, social goods2 and their distribution are always at stake (Gee 
2011:7). Politics can’t be conducted without language and the use of language in the 
constitution of social groups leads to what we call politics (Chilton and Schaffner 
1997:206). Discourse of any kind is thus political since it serves as a site of struggle, a 
semantic place in which meanings are produced and/or challenged (Seidel 1985:45). In 
addition language becomes a strategic resource used to gain and hold power. Political 
statements are not neutral utterances but rather function as a means to achieve political 
goals create allegiances, oppositions and present an image of national unity. (Hudson 
1978:41;61) 
Discourse analysis can illuminate problems and controversies in the world and 
show issues about the distribution of social goods. (Gee 2011:10) People’s differential 
access to different identities and practices, connected to different sorts of status and social 
goods, is a root source of inequality in society. Since different identities and activities are 
enacted in and through language, the study of language is integrally connected to matters 
of equity and justice and intervening in such matters can be a contribution to social justice. 
(Gee 2011:30) Thus language becomes closely linked with notions such as power, 
hegemony, antagonism and social struggle – all of which will be more deeply discussed 
in the following chapters. 
Approaches on analysing language can be divided in two – a more descriptive 
approach and a critical one. The first looks at language to see how it works in order to 
                                                          
2 Gee defines social goods as anything some people in a society want and value. (Gee 2011: 5) 
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understand it. The second on the other hand aims to add a more critical aspect to the 
previous goals by also speaking to and, perhaps, intervening in social or political issues, 
problems and controversies in the world thus applying their work. (Gee 2001: 9) 
 
Discourse and identity 
 
Discourses play a central role in the making of identities (Epstein 2010:328) and 
thus the question of identity is at the ontological and epistemological centre of 
poststructuralist discourse analysis. (Hansen 2006:37). In the poststructuralist research 
agenda, identity is seen as discursive, political, relational and social. By being discursive 
and political, the representations of identity are seen as to place foreign policy issues 
within a particular imperative optic, one with consequences for foreign policy. To see 
identity as discursive means that there are no objective identities that are located in some 
extra-discursive realm and thus, identity cannot be used as a variable against which 
behaviour and non-discursive factors can be measured. To view identity as relational 
means to see it always being given through reference to what it is not and to see it as 
social, means to understand it as established through a set of collectively articulated 
codes. (Hansen 2006:6) 
The conceptualization of identity as discursive, political, relational and social 
implies an articulation of a Self and one or several Others. (Hansen 2006:6) Identities are 
constructed inter-subjectively in a social relationship with significant others taking the 
form of enemies, rivals or friends. (Berenskoetter 2011:650) Waever states that identity 
is a relational concept, which is produced through, and produces itself, juxtapositions 
between selves and others. (Waever 2001:24) The analysis is not focused simply on who 
we are, but on the ways in which one conceives this we through the articulation of 
different layers of identity in complex constellations of competition and mutual 
definition. (Waever 2001:25) The other may be constructed through geographical, 
political and temporal representations and the degree of difference (‘degree of otherness’) 
of the other may vary significantly. (Hansen 2006:6-7) Methodologically one should 
therefore begin by identifying those terms that indicate a clear construction of the other 
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or of the self and the location of these designated signs within a larger system. (Hansen 
2006:41-42)  
Politicians often present the adoption of certain policies as caused by a particular 
representation if identity. (Hansen 2006:26) A construction of a link between identity and 
policy makes the two appear consistent with each other and allows for the legitimacy and 
enforceability of the foreign policy. (Hansen 2006:28) States, just like individuals, 
position themselves in relation to other states by adopting certain discourses and not 
others. These discourses operate as important principles of coherence for statehood. 
(Epstein 2010:341) A noteworthy feature of international politics is the relative stability 
of state positioning in the international fora – regardless of the changes in leadership, its 
line tends to remain relatively consistent. Explicit decisions to change positions of course 
bring about a change in discourses. (Epstein 2010:341) 
According to Hansen, identity is constructed through discourse and foreign policies 
draw upon representations of identity for their legitimacy. Identity and foreign policy are 
mutually constitutive and cannot be separated from each other thus making it impossible 
to create a causal relationship between them. (Hansen 2006:1-5) There are however 
limitations on foreign policy makers on which policy can be promoted and thus which 
representations of identities can be articulated. These external constraints are not 
objective material factors constituted outside of discourse but situating in, or products of, 
older and competing discourses. (Hansen 2006:30) As particular constructions of identity 
underpin and legitimize policies, the broader ambition is to show how these constructions 
impose particular constraints on which subjects can gain legitimate if circumscribed 
presence and which foreign policies might in turn be meaningfully proscribed. (Hansen 
2006:37) 
Hansen proposes four analytical steps to systematically analyse identity 
construction. These steps are as follows: a) the concept of identity should be able to 
assume degrees of otherness; b) identity construction involves not a single self-other 
dichotomy but a series of related yet slightly different juxtapositions that can be theorized 
as constituting processes of linking and differentiation (establish the meaning of each 
sign); c) the construction of identity in foreign policy discourse can be analysed through 
a consideration of how identity is always spatially, temporally and ethically situated (the 
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interlinking of these dimensions of identity construction  provides a possibility for 
analysing differences between discourses and their changes over time); and d) discourses 
can be seen as organized within a field of debate. (Hansen 2006:37-38)  
Discourse theory holds that identity is shaped in and through its relation to other 
meanings, and singular meanings or identities should always be analysed in specific 
discursive contexts that condition how they are constructed and interpreted. (Torfing 
2004:14) Identity is constituted through the linking and differentiation of a series of signs, 
and one will usually focus on one in particular and analyse how this privileged identity is 
constructed through the processes of linking and juxtaposition. (Hansen 2006:45) 
Analytically, the construction of identity should be situated within a careful investigation 
of which signs are articulated by a particular discourse or text, how they are coupled to 
achieve discursive stability, where instabilities and slips between these constructions 
might occur, and how competing discourses construct the same sign to different effects. 
(Hansen 2006:42) 
Discourse theory 
 
The theory has its roots in Michael Foucaults’ ideas. In his studies Foucault focused 
on the rules that govern which statements can be accepted as meaningful and true in a 
particular historical epoch. He also developed a theory of power and knowledge. 
According to Foucault, power does not belong to any particular agent but is spread across 
different social practices and power provides the conditions of possibility for the social. 
(Jorgensen and Phillips 2002:12-13) Power is seen as a both a productive and a 
constraining force. (Jorgensen and Phillips 2002:14) 
Laclau and Mouffe describe discourse as and thought the following concepts: 
“[W]e will call articulation any practice establishing a relation among 
elements such that their identity is modified as a result of the articulatory 
practice. The structured totality resulting from the articulatory practice, we 
will call discourse. The differential positions, insofar as they appear 
articulated within a discourse, we will call moments. By contrast, we will call 
element any difference that is not discursively articulated.” (Laclau and 
Mouffe 2001:105) 
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The discourse theory developed by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe has its 
starting point in the poststructuralist idea that discourse constructs the social world in 
meaning and due to the inherent instability of language, this meaning can never be 
permanently fixed. (Jorgensen and Phillips 2002:6) Thus the key word for the theory is 
discursive struggle – meaning that different discourses (each of them representing 
particular ways of talking about and understanding the social world) are engaged in 
constant struggle with one another to achieve hegemony (to fix the meanings of language 
in their own way). (Jorgensen and Phillips 2002:6-7) 
Laclau and Mouffe do not distinguish between discursive and non-discursive 
dimensions of the social – discourse itself is fully constitutive of our world. (Laclau and 
Mouffe 2001:107) The perceived denial of the existence is of the material, often used to 
critique Discourse Theory, is however incorrect. In the view of Laclau and Mouffe, “What 
is denied is not that such objects exist externally to thought, but the rather different 
assertion that they could constitute themselves as objects outside any discursive condition 
of emergence.” (Laclau and Mouffe 2001: 108) To them discourses are material in the 
sense that both social and material objects do exist however they possess no meaning in 
themselves. (Jorgensen and Phillips 2002:35) 
Their discourse theory carries the overall idea that social phenomena are never 
finished or total and that meaning can never be truly fixed. This opens up the way for 
constant social struggles about definitions of society and identity, with resulting social 
effects. (Jorgensen and Phillips 2002:24) The overall aim is to map out the processes in 
which we struggle about the way in which the meaning of signs is to be fixed and the 
process by which some fixations of meaning become so conventionalized that we begin 
to think of them as natural. (Jorgensen and Phillips 2002:26) In the words of Laclau and 
Mouffe: 
“[I]n an articulated discursive totality, where every element occupies a 
differential position — in our terminology, where every element has been 
reduced to a moment of that totality — all identity is relational and all 
relations have a necessary character./…/ Everything is so necessary in it that 
modifications of the whole and of the details reciprocally condition one 
another. The relativity of values is the best proof that they depend closely 
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upon one another in the synchrony of a system which is always being 
threatened, always being restored. The point is that all values are values of 
opposition and are defined only by their difference. (Laclau and Mouffe 
2001:106) 
To Laclau and Mouffe a discourse is understood as a fixation of meaning within a 
particular domain in which the meaning of each sign is determined by its relation to other 
signs. (Jorgensen and Phillips 2002:26) Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory suggests 
that we focus on specific expressions in their capacity as articulations by asking what 
meanings they establish and what meanings they exclude by positioning elements in 
particular relationship with one other. (Jorgensen and Phillips 2002:29) A discourse is 
always constituted in relation to an outside (what it excludes) and it is always in danger 
of being undermined by it. (Jorgensen and Phillips 2002:25) 
 
Key concepts 
 
As stated before, for Laclau and Mouffe there is no objective material reality – 
material reality does exist but humans have no access to it that is not mediated through 
discourse. Thus discursive and non-discursive are inseparable. Since all access to reality 
is through discourse, the meanings of social phenomena are never fixed. Different 
discourses, each structuring the world in its own way, compete to define what is ‘true’ 
within a particular aspect of the world. (Rear p.5) 
Laclau and Mouffe have adopted the notion of the sign from the linguistic theory 
of Ferdinand de Saussure. The sign is conceived as the relation between an acoustic image 
(the signifier) and a concept (the signified). These signs constitute a system in which no 
element can be defined independently of others. (Laclau 2007:542) Jorgensen and Phillips 
explain this through the use of the analogy of a fishing net – all signs can be thought of 
as knots in a fishing net, deriving their meaning from their position in the net (their 
difference from one another). However unlike the fishing net, the signs are not 
permanently fixed – their position may change and they may acquire new meanings. 
(Jorgensen and Phillips 2002:25)  
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A discourse is a fixation of meaning within a particular domain and all signs in a 
discourse are moments. Discourses are organized around nodal points, around which 
meaning is partially fixed. These nodal points are privileged signs around which other 
signs are ordered. These other signs acquire their meaning from their relation to the nodal 
points (Jorgensen and Phillips 2002:26) and are empty in themselves. (Jorgensen and 
Phillips 2002:28) A discourse is established as a totality in which each sign is fixed as a 
moment through its relation to other signs by the exclusion of all other possible meanings 
that the sign could have held. (Jorgensen and Phillips 2002:26-27) 
Meaning and identity are constructed through a series of signs that are linked to 
each other to constitute relations of sameness and of difference. (Hansen 2006:42) Being 
a woman is defined with words like emotional, motherly, reliant and simple. This is the 
process of linking (positive identity). This series of links is at the same time juxtaposed 
to the series of links of what it means to be a man. A man, in the same manner, would be 
defined as rational, intellectual, independent and complex. This contrasting is the process 
of differentiating (negative identity). (Hansen 2006 19.20) Thus one should begin by 
identifying the signs articulated by a particular discourse or text and analyse how these 
signs are coupled to achieve discursive stability, where instabilities and slips might occur, 
and how competing discourses construct the same signs to different effects. (Hanesn 
2006:42) 
In Laclau and Mouffe theory, signs whose meanings have not yet been fixed and 
which have multiple potential meanings are defined as elements. (Jorgensen and Phillips 
2002:27) Floating signifiers are elements which are particularly open to different 
ascriptions of meaning. They are the signs that different discourses struggle to invest with 
meaning in their own particular way. Nodal points as well are floating signifiers but 
whereas the term nodal point refers to a point of crystallisation within a specific discourse, 
the term floating signifier belongs to the ongoing struggle between different discourses 
to fix the meaning of important signs. (Jorgensen and Phillips 2002:28)  
Discourses are in constant conflict in trying to fix the meaning of certain signs. 
They each try to structure signs as if they all had fixed and unambiguous meanings in the 
total structure. (Jorgensen and Phillips 2002:33) Yet no discourse can be fully established 
and the conflict with other discourses that define reality differently is ever persistent. This 
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constitutes a struggle over the creation of meaning. (Jorgensen and Phillips 2002:47) 
There is always room for struggles over what the structures of meaning should look like, 
what discourses should prevail and how meaning should be ascribed to individual signs. 
(Jorgensen and Phillips 2002:29) 
The term key events refers to situations where important facts manifest themselves 
on the political and/ or media agenda. Discourses often provide different readings of facts 
and events when trying to engage and contest each other by challenging policy, identity 
and the logic through which they are linked. Mapping debates around key events can be 
used to construct a timeline which in turn can be employed when empirical material is 
selected. (Hansen 2006:32) 
Hegemony is the expansion of a discourse or set of discourses into a dominant 
horizon of social orientation and action by means of articulating unfixed elements into 
partially fixed moments. (Torfing, 1999: 101) To Laclau and Mouffe “Hegemony will 
allude to an absent totality, and to the diverse attempts at recomposition and 
rearticulation which, in overcoming this original absence, made it possible for struggles 
to be given a meaning and for historical forces to be endowed with full positivity.” (Laclau 
and Mouffe 2001:7)  
When discourses become hegemonic, the social practices they structure can reach 
the level of common sense, in that their origins and intrinsic contingency are forgotten. 
However no discourse is capable of becoming completely hegemonic and thus the 
domination of a particular discourse is never complete or permanent. Every hegemonic 
order is susceptible of being challenged by counter-hegemonic practices, which attempt 
to disarticulate it in order to install another form of hegemony. These counter-hegemonies 
may take place naturally though a day-to-day communicative practices which challenge 
existing discourses, or they might be a deliberate and strategic act by interests groups to 
gain discursive dominance. (Rear; p.8) 
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Empirical part 
 
Methodology 
 
This thesis adopts a poststructuralist approach to the relationship between 
discourse, identity and foreign policy, basing mainly on the works of Hansen, Laclau and 
Mouffe. The official discourse expressed by the political leaders of the EU is seen as a 
hegemonic discourse in the sense that it is dominant on the social, political and media 
fronts. This hegemonic discourse is challenged by counter-hegemony discourses – in the 
thesis expressed by two European far-right political parties. The counter-hegemonic 
discourses are seen as trying to ascribe their own meaning to the Ukrainian crisis and to 
what this means for Europe and its identity. 
The empirical part of the thesis begins by the analysis of the official discourse – the 
representations of the self and the other within the official discourse will be ascertained. 
This will allow to investigate the identity formation – the way in which the self and the 
other is constructed in the light of the Ukrainian crisis – of the official discourse and, 
since identities and policies are linked, the implications of this identity on foreign policy. 
Establishing the official discourse will serve as a starting point to the following analysis 
and as a point for differentiation of the counter-hegemony discourses. 
The official discourse will be based on the readings of the speeches, statements, and 
articles etc. of EUs political leaders – the faces representing the Union on a day to day 
basis. These people are the President of the European Council, the President of the 
European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy. Important fact in this respect is that within the time period under the 
view, each of these positions has gone through a change in the persona who is carrying 
the position. These institutions are chosen for the identification of official discourses as 
they carry the responsibility of representing the Union, their statements are widely 
depicted in the general public (media etc.) and they carry strong political impact and 
legitimacy. The sources used for the official discourse of the EU are shown in the table 
below.  
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Table 1: Textual material for the analysis of the official discourse on the events in 
Ukraine  
 
EU: 
 
President of the European Council 
 President of the European Commission + Commissioner of Enlargement 
and European Neighbourhood Policy 
 High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 
 
The European Council is the institution that sets the general policy directions of the 
EU but it is not a legislative institution. It compromises of the heads of state or 
government of the member states. This institution is particularly important for the Unions 
foreign policy as the latter field is one of the policy areas in which the overall competence 
of the Union is the lowest. Foreign policy is regarded as a policy area that is more in the 
competence of individual member states. Thus the European Council plays an important 
role in setting the overall tone and course of the EU foreign policy. The President of the 
Council however is the representative of the institution and its public face communicating 
its decisions to the wider public. 
The European Commission is the responsible with the composing of legislative 
propositions to the Parliament and the Council. It is also tasked with the commitment of 
protecting the general interests of the Union as a whole (and not the interests of individual 
member states). Thus this institution is especially important when it comes to policy 
proposals of the EU regarding the events in Ukraine. It is the commission who represents 
and defends individual policies adopted by the Union to the wider public. The president 
of the Commission is the face of this process. To complement the material key texts 
produced by the Commissioner of Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy will 
also be added. These texts include, for example, speeches made to the European 
Parliament regarding the events in Ukraine.   
The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy is 
also the Vice-President of the Vice-President of the European Commission (HR/VP) and 
is the official face of the European common foreign and security policy. The HR/VP is 
also the head of the European External Action Service (EEAS). As the face and main 
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coordinator of the common foreign policy, the HR/VP is often the first person to represent 
the Union in important foreign policy areas and is on the ground of where relative events 
are taking place (like Kiev) conducting EU diplomacy.  
The official discourse is thus formed basing on the readings of the statements of the 
leaders of the three institutions described above – each of these institutions important in 
its own way. The official discourse is analysed through the construction of a timeline 
created by key events - situations in which important facts manifest themselves. These 
key events are: 1) the failure to sign the Association Agreement with Ukraine and the 
start of the Maidan protest in Ukraine; 2) the annexation of Crimea by Russia and 5) the 
beginning and escalation of an armed conflict in Eastern Ukraine. These key events are 
clearly visible in the official discourse as points in which changes to the discourse – 
especially in the construction of the other – appeared. The key events will be used to 
analyse the changes in discourses through time as each discourse responds to the events 
in the international arena. 
Adding the oppositional discourse to the framework allows to analyse, as stated 
before, the hegemony of the official discourse. These counter-hegemony discourses are 
seen as expressing radically different views of the Ukrainian crisis and EUs role within it 
from those of the official discourse. These discourses are in constant struggle with the 
official discourse in trying ascribe meaning to events in their own way and thus they 
produce strongly different readings of facts and events. 
The oppositional or counter-hegemony discourses will be analysed through the 
readings of texts produced by two European far-right political parties. Each of the parties 
will be analysed separately regarding their construction of the self and other and their 
views on the Ukrainian crisis in general. After which it will be analysed in which way 
these parties are discursively similar and where they differ. It is presumed that the 
counter-hegemony discourses of these parties are radically different from that of the 
official discourse, contesting the official discourse in many fields. The full sources 
selected for the collection of empirical data for counter-hegemonic discourses is listed in 
Table 2 on the next page. 
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The parties chosen are both far-right political parties that are active in Europe. The first 
of these parties – Jobbik – is based in Hungary and has its representatives in the European 
Parliament, showing that it is a considerable political force. British National Party (BNP) 
however is of lesser importance having little electoral success in recent years. Regardless 
the party is politically outspoken and voices its opinions loudly. These parties were 
selected for the analysis of the counter-hegemonic discourses because both parties 
expressed their views regarding the events in Ukraine in English and had easily accessible 
material that could be directly linked to their political views (not, for example, articles in 
which their leaders were simply quoted). In addition, since both parties are both far-right 
they would be able to complement each other (allowing to analyse the differences and 
similarities in far-right discourses). 
Official discourse –  choice and description of textual material 
 
The official discourse of the EU regarding the events in Ukraine is based on extensive 
readings and re-readings of the official statements, speeches etc. made by the political 
leaders of the Union during the period of November 2013 – February 2015. This time 
period is chosen to reflect the evolution of the events in Ukraine with the beginning being 
the outcome of the Vilnius summit and the EUs response to it. The given time period is 
divided into three periods by key events that can be distinguished to have brought on 
changes in EU policies and minor changes in discourses. These periods are: a) the 
outcome of the Vilnius summit and the protests in Maidan; b) the annexation of Crimea 
and c) the conflict in Eastern Ukraine.  
Table 2: Textual material for the establishment of counterhegemonic discourses  on 
the events in Ukraine – European Political Parties 
 
Far-Right  
 
Jobbik in Hungary 
 British National Party in the UK 
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The data collected carries 125 speeches, statements and letters etc. collected from the 
EU political leaders. Within this data there is 35 speeches and statements made by the 
previous HR/VP Catherine Ashton, 30 of them made by the previous President of the 
European Council Herman Van Rompuy (out of which 16 are remarks, 7 speeches and 7 
statements), 11 are made jointly by Herman Van Rompuy and the previous President of 
European Commission José Manuel Barroso (1 article, 1 joint letter, 8 joint statements, 1 
joint message). 19 speeches belong to Barroso and 9 to Commissioner for Enlargement 
Štefan Füle. There is also 1 joint statement by Füle and Ashton. There are also 9 
statements made by the current President of the European Council Donald Tusk (5 
statements, 3 remarks, 1 speech) and 15 statements belonging to the current HR/VP 
Federica Mogherini (out of which 4 speeches given to the European Parliament).  
All this material is collected through the screening of the vast amount of textual 
material published on EU web archives of the institution at hand. The published material 
is screened for its relevance to the events in Ukraine and only those speeches, statements 
etc. were selected that made explicit references to the events in Ukraine. The texts 
selected for analysis reflect the official EU political stance on Ukraine and thus carry EU 
identity articulations regarding the events in Ukraine and their foreign policy links. All 
texts chosen are easily accessible to the wider public and made by key EU politicians who 
carry the legitimacy and authority to speak on the matter. All texts chosen are available 
in English, though this may not, in all cases, be the original language in which they were 
produced since the French and German are also often used as EU working languages.   
 
Analysis of the official discourse – the Maidan protests  
 
In November 2013 the third Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius gathered the 
representatives of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine and the 
representatives of the European Union and the Heads of State or Government and 
representatives of its Member States to bring the Eastern Partnership (EaP) forwards by 
the signing of association agreements. Though much progress was made the failure to 
sign a long time negotiated Association agreement and DCFTA with Ukraine became 
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centre of attention for the media and politicians alike. Many felt this failure was the 
Unions fault and would compromise the future and credibility of the Eastern Partnership.  
Ukraine’s decision to postpone the signing was a disappointment for the Union. “The 
Partnership is being tested by the decision of Ukraine not to sign the AA/DCFTA at this 
stage, but the European Union has come out stronger, because it did not compromise 
when faced with external pressure. It stood firm. It stood united /…/” (Füle 10. December 
2013). The external pressure referred here by Füle was Russia’s economic and political 
pressure on Ukraine not to sign the agreements, which in the end came on top. Ukraine’s 
signing of the AA/DCFTA would have not only led Ukraine closer to the EU but would 
have compromised Russia’s desire to create an economic and political bloc named the 
Eurasian Union with Belarus and Kazakhstan. The sudden turn of president Yanukovych 
however made thousands of Ukrainians come out to the streets to protest in a way which 
received the world’s attention. Ukraine not signing the agreements, is often referred to, 
by the official discourse as a challenge or a test to the EU. But, as demonstrated by the 
example above, the official discourse is attempting to reject the idea of it being a failure 
of the EU. Instead it is depicted as a manifestation of the strength and resilience of EU 
politics. 
The Maidan protest were, from there on, depicted as a direct outcome and 
consequence of the Vilnius summit. “The Vilnius Summit is continuing on the streets and 
squares of Kiev” (Füle 10. December 2013). The events of Maidan are seen as “an 
expression of the majority of the people in Ukraine in favour of European values – it was 
a “civilisation choice” (Van Rompuy 6. March and 7. March 2014) and puts Ukraine on 
the “right side of history” (Van Rompuy 7. March 2014). The Maidan movement was a 
“democratic uprising”, “a political and cultural shift” and “a clash of two political 
cultures” powered by the “yearning for a European way of life” (Van Rompuy 8. April 
2014). Thus the Maidan protest are shown in a positive light and as a change for the better 
for the Ukrainian people. Choosing democracy and civil rights is automatically tied with 
choosing the EU. The latter choice however is depicted as the right one, leaving the 
alternative, closer ties with Russia, in the negative realm.  
From the previous examples it can be seen that the Maidan protests are presented by 
the official discourse in a manner designed to increase the legitimacy to the EU by making 
34 
 
it seem necessary and important. The union has, for a while now, suffered under a 
legitimacy crisis due to the severe problems with the Eurozone and the rise of anti-EU 
political parties within several EU member states like Greece, France and UK. It is also 
worrying that these, often extreme-left or –right parties gained a significant popularity 
before the 2014 EP elections and thus now hold a noticeable number of seats within the 
EP. These concerns and the way they are linked to the Ukrainian events can be illustrated 
by President Barroso’s speech:  
“/…/ the populist forces, the extremist forces are negative forces that are 
today under a theme that is very often an anti-European theme, making the 
revival of all the demons of Europe, like extreme nationalism, like 
xenophobia, sometimes racism – these are negative values. It is important, in 
face of these challenges /…/ to have the courage to go out and fight /…/to 
explain /…/ why we care about Europe, why Europe is something we must 
cherish precisely to defend these values. And if sometimes in Europe some of 
us have doubts about how important these values are, just look at Ukraine. 
Those young people in the streets of Ukraine, with freezing temperatures, are 
writing the new narrative for Europe. Europe is not just the land of 
opportunity/…/Europe is the promise of hope and freedom. And I think the 
European Union has the right and the duty to stand by the people of Ukraine 
in this very difficult moment, because they are giving Europe one of the 
greatest contributions that can be given.” 
 (Barroso 9.December 2013) 
 
The example above illustrates the way in which the events in Ukraine are strongly 
linked to the European idea and values and how these events are used to explain the 
necessity and raison d'être of the EU.  Europe is connected to the values of freedom, 
democracy and rule of law. It also shows how EUs support for Ukraine is linked to these 
same values that the Union holds. It is seen as Europe’s duty to help those who are striving 
towards freedom and democracy. In general the events in Ukraine are seen as to 
demonstrate that the values on which the EU was built upon are still relevant today, 
regardless of being taken for granted by so many in Europe enjoying the benefits the EU 
brings. The way in which the official discourse uses the events in Ukraine to gain 
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legitimacy for itself and show the necessity of the EU can also be illustrated by the 
following examples: 
“The hundreds of thousands of pro-EU protesters we saw in Ukraine earlier 
this year show that the ideas underpinning the creation of the European 
Union are still very much alive and shared even outside its borders.”  
(Füle 16. May 2014) 
 
“Waving European flags and camping under open skies in freezing 
temperatures, the Ukrainian people demonstrated why Europe is important, 
what Europe means and what Europe stands for. The Ukrainian people stood 
for freedom, democracy and rule of law. These are precisely the values which 
are the core of the European Union. And, Europe will always stand with 
countries willing to engage in this path.” 
 (Barroso 12. September 2014) 
 
The main criticism of the Maidan events aims to draw attention to the divided nature 
of Ukraine. It is often claimed that while the western part of Ukraine is pro-European, the 
east is more inclined towards Russia. Thus the Maidan protest cannot be seen to carry the 
will of the entire Ukrainian people and due to that it is not as legitimate. To this criticism 
Barroso states that “it is not true that it is just in the Western part of Ukraine. No, most of 
the Ukrainians care about a future in peace and freedom” (Barroso 9. December 2013) 
This shows that a future in peace and freedom is directly linked to a future closer to the 
EU. While it may be the case that everyone would want to live in peace and freedom, it 
may not automatically mean a desire to be closer to the EU.  
Russia plays a crucial role in the discourse following the Vilnius Summit. This role 
is two folds. First, within this time period Russia is referred to as a common neighbour or 
“strategic partner” (Van Rompuy 28. January 2014) with whom common interests and 
goals can be found. Europe and Russia are seen as partners and this partnership is shown 
as something that is very desirable to the Union. And thus the EU reassures again and 
again the “win-win” nature of the association of the EU and Ukraine, where both Russia 
and the EU stand to gain. Ukraine’s’ stronger relations with the EU do not come at the 
expense of relations with Russia. The EU is ready to “clarify” this to the Russian 
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federation whilst “fully respecting the sovereignty and independence” of the shared 
neighbours and the bilateral nature of the Association Agreement and the DFTAs. (Van 
Rompuy & Barroso 25. & 27. November 2013; Füle 10. December 2013) The latter – 
respect for the sovereignty of the EaP countries – is a recurrent theme in the discourse. 
While recognizing Russia’s interests and concerns they are at the same time shown as of 
lesser priority than the principle of sovereignty.   
The second view of Russia however is more critical representing Russia as 
“dissuading the Ukrainian people from taking up new opportunities” (Füle 20. December 
2013) and as exposing external pressure on Ukraine depriving it of its right to decide for 
itself. Russia, in this aspect, is seen as the ‘other’ to the EU. While the Union respects the 
sovereignty of Ukraine and helps its people in their endeavours, Russia is doing the exact 
opposite and is not seen as to have Ukraine’s best interests at heart.  Russia is indirectly 
accused of conducting geopolitical zero-sum games and secret agreements – “The people 
of Ukraine, its independence and sovereignty should not become victims of geopolitical 
zero-sum games or secret agreements” (Füle 10. December 2013) 
Rising from this the official discourse often calls for a change in paradigms. For 
example: “We need to change the perception that one region’s gain is another region’s 
pain. We in the European Union are against the mentality of block against block. We 
believe the European Union and Russia have all to gain from a cooperative attitude” 
(Barroso 28. January 2014). It is shown that the fault in this lies with the Russian 
Federation while the EU is co-operative. This contrast can be illustrated by the following 
statement: “EU and Russia coexist on the same continent and therefore must work 
together to ensure stability, prosperity, global security on basis of respect for territorial 
integrity and sovereignty of our neighbours. Geopolitical rivalry has no place in this 
equation.” (Füle 22. July 2014)   
“We denounce those who are trying to turn the Eastern Partnership into 
something it is not: a zero-sum game, a battle for the creation past centuries’ 
spheres of influence in the neighbourhood. This has never been the case. We 
will not adopt this mind-set.”  
(Füle 17. July 2014) 
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“The doctrine of limited sovereignty should belong in history books. And 
history belongs to those that embrace the future, not those who try to hijack 
it.”  
(Barroso 13. May 2014) 
 
This view of the EU rejecting all sorts of thinking in geopolitical terms or ideas of 
spheres of influence or blocs is also a recurrent theme in the official discourse. “The 
outdated logic of the balance of powers is dangerous and wrong and we need to replace 
it with a logic of cooperation and dialogue.” (Barroso 5. March 2014) This kind of 
thinking is seen as out dated and wrong, belonging to a time far gone. Europe is shown 
as not about rivalry or competition but about co-operation and mutual benefits. In this 
sense the EU is again differentiated from Russia with the latter being the one who is trying 
to recreate the past and the one viewing EU and its actions in the eastern neighbourhood 
in a competing way 
As mentioned above, one of the often recurring themes in the official discourse is the 
right of Ukraine to make its own sovereign decisions. The EU will not force Ukraine to 
choose between itself and any other regional entity – Ukraine has the right to “freely 
decide” (Van Rompuy & Barroso  25. November 2013) and exercise its “sovereign choice 
– a choice that should be free of external pressure and made in the interests of their own 
citizens – to take up the EU offer, which includes living up to necessary values and 
standards”. (Van Rompuy & Barroso 27. November 2013) Thus it is portrayed that the 
EU is a neutral entity that is not interfering in or having influence over Ukraine. 
Meanwhile, as shown by previous statements, it is Russia who is exercising its influence 
and using unfair methods to forward its own interests in the region. 
Association agreement in the official discourses is portrayed as “a win-win” (Van 
Rompuy & Barroso 25 & 27 November 2013); “an attractive strategic vision” (Van 
Rompuy & Barroso 27. November 2013), “a compass” (Van Rompuy 21.March 
2014), “a blueprint for political and economic reforms” (Ashton 16. December 
2013). Partnership with EU would bring “long-term benefits” (Van Rompuy & 
Barroso 27.November 2013; Van Rompuy 29. November 2013) – support for 
Ukraine’s economic situation, reform course, and modernization for a prosperous 
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and stable future for Ukraine. (Van Rompuy & Barroso 27. November 2013) 
Signing of which “is a free choice neither imposed nor triggered by manipulation, 
provocation or violence” and does not “come for free” with having “strict criteria 
and benchmarks” in place unlike that of Russia’s offering of unconditional loans. 
(Van Rompuy 8. April 2014) The conditional nature of the relationship between 
Ukraine and the EU is also something often expressed. Regardless of the situation 
in Ukraine, the Union is making no concessions and Ukraine is expected to fulfil 
the same criteria that every other country in the EaP. The EU is thus shown as firm 
and true to its established rules and procedures.  
The official discourse describes the EU as “a dynamic project” (Van Rompuy 29. 
November 2013), “a living entity” (Van Rompuy 10.November 2014) which can only 
“flourish as an integrated continent without dividing lines” (Van Rompuy & Barroso 27. 
November 2013) “European aspirations and European choice are not vain words. EU 
believes in close political ties and in the power of shared prosperity” (Van Rompuy  
29.November 2014). Europe is shown as something that is in constant development. This 
development  means striving towards a Europe that has close political and economic ties 
thus bringing security and prosperity. The EU is the main engine in this process. 
When the protests in Maidan erupted the official position called for restraint from 
violence and respect for fundamental freedoms. During this time period the situation was 
often referred to as “a political stalemate” (Füle 10. December 2013; Ashton 9. December 
2013 & 16. December 2013) The Ukrainian authorities were seen to have a “special 
responsibility” for overcoming the “stalemate” (Van Rompuy 28. January 2014, Ashton 
20. February 2014) and were on several occasions condemned for “the unjustified use of 
excessive force” (Van Rompuy 19. February 2014; Barroso 19. February 2014). Never 
the less the EU did not at any point call for the resignation of president Yanukovych – 
“The president is the President” (Ashton 21. February 2014). While the Union might have 
been unhappy about the president’s decision not to sign the AA/DCFTA, the official 
discourse shows no direct criticism in this aspect of the then president and government. 
From here on of the key words became “de-escalation” for which, until the annexation of 
Crimea, the responsible party were seen to be the Ukrainian officials. After the annexation 
of Crimea however the call and the responsibility for de-escalation is mostly aimed at 
Russia.  
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The EU is also seen to have “a special responsibility” to help Ukraine out of its 
current difficulties (Ashton 14. February 2014). Thus the EU’s role in the crisis is seen as 
to offer expert support for conducting reforms in Ukraine (Van Rompuy 19. February 
2014); put to force targeted measures such as sanctions and visa restrictions against those 
responsible for violence (Van Rompuy 19. February 2014; Barroso 19. February 2014) 
and offer assistance to facilitate political dialogue (Barroso 19. February 2014). Dialogue 
is seen as the “only democratic and peaceful way out of the crisis” (Van Rompuy 21. 
February 2014, Ashton 27. January 2014). This however must be Ukrainian owned and 
led process (Ashton 16. February 2013) – “Only one plan can work here: a Ukrainian 
plan agreed by Ukrainians and implemented swiftly” (Füle 13. February 2014). In this 
aspect the Union is somewhat distancing itself from the process and putting the main 
responsibility on Ukraine. Regardless is shown as to have a onus in helping Ukraine due 
to firstly, the nature of the Maidan protests being an expression of the nation’s European 
aspirations, and secondly, due to nature of the Union itself: the values it adheres to and 
promises of a better live it can give. 
Even though EU’s unity in dealing with the Ukrainian crisis is often mentioned, its 
true existence can be questioned, since occasionally, steps are not taken by the EU 
institutions but are coordinated by member states such as France, Germany and Poland. 
An example would be the facilitation of the agreement between the opposition party 
leaders and President Yanukovych (Ashton 21. February 2014). 
There is also a hint for the European membership perspective for Ukraine in the 
official discourse, regardless of the so called “enlargement fatigue”. For example: “We 
think, in the longer-term perspective, that this country looks for the same values that I, 
and the European Union, hold dear: the freedom of assembly, the basic human rights that 
people should have” (Ashton 11. December 2013). Similar stance is taken by Barroso: 
“/…/ our offer of political association and economic integration remains on the table, 
and does not constitute the final goal in our cooperation” (Barroso 19. February 2014) 
and is also repeated by Füle “the AA7DCFTA does not constitute the final goal in EU-
Ukraine cooperation.” (Füle 25. April 2014) Ukraine is seen as a potential member to the 
EU and thus is seen as a European country, sharing the values and principles on which 
the union is built. In this sense Ukraine is not an ‘other’ to the Union. This however on 
the backdrop that the EU expects Ukraine to fill the conditions set to it and share the 
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common values and objectives. (Van Rompuy & Barroso 25. & 27. November 2013) 
These common values are democracy, rule of law, cooperation, multi-party system, and 
respect for fundamental freedoms (Van Rompuy & Barroso 27. November2013). 
On the 22nd of February, after the violence in the Madan square gained new 
dimensions, the Ukrainian parliament decided that president Yanukovych was incapable 
of fulfilling his duties and he was thus removed from power. However this was not 
touched upon by the official discourse. There is no mention of EUs stance on these events 
– there is no discussion on its legality, neither is there condemnation of it as illegitimate. 
It is presumable that the EU could not officially support the removal of an elected 
president from his position. Never the less, neither could it condemn it afterwards since 
that would go against other aspects within the discourse. The removal of Yanukovych 
brought with it the escalation of tensions and a worsening or the whole situation. 
 
Analysis of the official discourse: Annexation of Crimea 
 
The crisis in Crimea began in the February of 2013 and escalated from there on. By 
the end of February (the 28th) Russian military forces entered the peninsula and gained 
control over the area. Less than a week later Crimea joined the Russian Federation. From 
here on the official discourse adopted a more negative perception of Russia. While 
previously, Russia was seen as a partner for the EU, Russia’s actions in Crimea made a 
partnership difficult. 
Russia’s actions in Crimea are portrayed repeatedly as aggression, a  violation of 
Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and a threat to European security and 
international order. The language used became hash and was guided directly at Russia 
(not ambiguously). This is a much stronger language used regarding Russia from that of 
the one depicted before the events in Crimea – thus the annexation of Crimea constitutes 
a key event in which the changes in the discourse can clearly be identified. After this key 
event the negative ‘othering’ of Russia intensified.  
The EU is seen to have a “special responsibility for peace, stability and prosperity” 
in the European continent (Van Rompuy  6. March 2014). The events in Crimea 
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“reminded us, us that principles we cherish, like peace, cannot be taken for granted” 
(Barroso 5. March 2014) Europe needs to be united and joint effort needs to be made by 
the EU institutions and the member states in this dangerous world (Van Rompuy 7. March 
2014). The annexation of Crimea touches on the chords of the European identity, as the 
EU was created just for this reason – to prevent such things happening in Europe. “What 
is happening to the East of the European Union, in the conflict between Russia and 
Ukraine /…/ threatens the very security of Europe internally and the very idea of what 
Europe stands for internationally.” (Barroso 21. September 2014)  
Barroso also states that “Recent events from Afghanistan to Africa and even more 
recently Ukraine have shown that for the sake of its own stability and security, Europe 
has to pay attention to old “frozen conflicts” and potential new flashpoints.” (Barroso 4. 
March 2014). “Crisis around Ukraine” is seen as a “matter of great concern for peace 
and security on the European Continent, reviving memories of a history which we thought 
was over” (Van Rompuy 8. April 2014). The annexation of Crimea “triggered the gravest 
threat to the European security order in decades” (Van Rompuy 25. September 2014) 
being a “situation without precedent with boarders disregarded for the first time since 
the Second World War” (Van Rompuy 10. October 2014).  
From the previous two paragraphs three conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, the 
Crimean events are also (like the events on the Maidan), in a way, shown as to give 
purpose to existence of the EU. Europe is meant to stand for peace in the continent, as it 
was created for, and this task should not be taken for granted, the peace enjoyed in Europe 
should not be taken for granted. Peace is a result of a unified Europe. Secondly, the 
annexation of Crimea is seen as a grave threat to European security as it is a revival of 
the time when Europe was in war. The annexation of Crimea is linked to WWII and thus 
to the Austrian Anschluss conducted by Hitler in the beginning of the war. The annexation 
is seen as a potential spark to a large scale war in EU neighbourhood, a war that will affect 
the entire continent. And thirdly, from the previous, the annexation of Crimea is linked 
to the European identity itself as peace in Europe is at the very heart of what Europe 
stands for. 
The first policy outcome was a financial package of support for Ukraine – which, 
combined, would bring overall support of at least 11 billion euros within the next couple 
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of years from both the EU budget and from EU based international financial institutions. 
This policy was backed by saying that the “international community should mobilise to 
help Ukraine stabilise its economic and financial situation which will in turn also 
contribute to political and social peace./…/ The situation in Ukraine is a test of our 
capability and resolve to stabilise our neighbourhood and to provide new opportunities 
to many, not just a few. We need to be up to this challenge.” (Barroso 5. March 2014) 
“This is certainly the most serious situation we are facing in the European continent in 
many years in terms of stability and threats to peace. We need to show our citizens and 
the people of Ukraine that we are up to this task.” (Barroso 6. March 2014) Thus 
measures adopted in the wake of the escalation of the crisis in Ukraine are backed by their 
promises of bringing stability and marinating peace in the region. It is also shown as a 
test for the Union and its unity – a test to which Europe must rise to so as to prove to the 
EU citizens that the Union is capable and relevant.   
As the situation in Crimea did not improve the EU adopted a policy of implementing 
sanctions in three stages. Sanctions are “not a question of retaliation” or “a goal in 
themselves” but a “foreign policy tool” and a “means to end”. (Van Rompuy  20. March 
2014) The hint here is that EU does not want to use sanctions but sees it as the only 
solution to stop Russian action against Ukraine. Regardless of being aware of the negative 
aspects that sanctions can have on EU economies, the EU did not “relent” since the 
“stability of the European house itself was at stake”. (Van Rompuy 25. September 2014) 
The political actions taken by the EU regarding Ukraine are backed by claims of EU 
having a special responsibility. This responsibility can be seen to rise from both the fact 
that Ukraine is an immediate neighbour (Barroso 5. June 2014) and of the fact that the 
events in Ukraine began by the Ukrainian people demonstrating their desire to have closer 
relations to the EU. Barroso even states that the EU owes it to the people of Ukraine to 
support it. (Barroso 12. September 2014) 
As the events unfolded the status of Russia changed. Van Rompuy called for the need 
to “rethink EU-Russia relationship” with Russia “trying to restore a foregone world that 
will never come back” (Van Rompuy 8. April 2014) Nevertheless the EU reiterated its 
willingness to “revise the sanctions provided there is tangible progress” – trust can be 
43 
 
rebuilt if promises are kept.” (Van Rompuy 25. September 2014) So all in all things can 
go back to normal if the Russian side meets the demands set by the Union. 
The referendum held in Crimea after the Russian military troops took the peninsula 
over is often referred by the EU official discourse as “so-called referendum” and as 
“illegal under the constitution of Ukraine and under international law” (Ashton 17. 
March 2014). The referenda in Crimea is “illegitimate and not credible” and a “way to 
stir up division among Ukraine’s communities” (Van Rompuy 12. May 2014). From here 
on the policy of non-recognition, neither of the annexation nor the referendum, became 
integrated in the EU narrative. (Barroso 14. May 2014, Ashton 23. June 2014) 
Before the European council meeting of 20/21 March of 2014 the language used, 
when talking about Russia’s actions in Crimea, was vaguer – calling it an unprovoked or 
illegal violation or as undermining towards Ukraine’s territorial integrity. However after 
the meeting Herman Van Rompuy, for the first time, called it an “annexation” and stating 
that “there is no place for the use of force and coercion to change borders on the 
European continent in the 21st century”. (Van Rompuy 20. March 2014) The first time 
Russia’s actions were described as an annexation by Catherine Ashton was at 3.of April 
2014 at her speech to the European Parliament in the debate on foreign and defence 
policy.  
 
Analysis of the official discourse: Armed conflict in Eastern Ukraine 
 
The tensions in Ukraine evolved towards an armed conflict in March-April 2014 
when armed individuals began seizing government buildings etc. in Eastern Ukraine. In 
the EU discourse these individuals were seen as separatist or separatist groups (Ashton 6. 
May 2014) on whom Russia was seen as to have considerable influence on and whose 
illegal actions are supported by “strong Russian State sponsored nationalist propaganda” 
(Barroso 29. July 2014). From here on the events are mostly described as a “downward 
spiral” or a “spiral of violence” (Ashton 23. June 2014) These groups were seen to be 
getting weapons and other equipment from the Russian boarder. However, Russia was 
not directly accused of arming them and sending its’ military troops to Ukraine. Instead 
Russia was seen as to allow the movement of people and weapons but not as directly 
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contributing to it. The end of august brought about a change and the “presence and actions 
of Russian armed forces on Ukrainian soil” (Van Rompuy 31. August2014) and 
“aggression against Ukraine by regular Russian military forces” (Ashton 30. August 
2014) is noted. 
With the annexation of Crimea and the escalation of violence in the Eastern Ukraine, 
Russia’s “other” status was changed to a more threatening one by being the destabilizer 
of Ukraine and breaker of international law and thus contributor to war and conflict on 
the continent. Russia is “contributing to the violence in the eastern regions” and needs to 
“contribute actively to de-escalation” by “using its leverage on the armed separatists”, 
“withdrawing its troops from the boarder” and “preventing the crossing of arms and 
weapons into Ukraine”. (Van Rompuy 4.June 2014) A few examples of negative 
‘othering’ of Russia: 
“We are faced with the most serious crisis since 1945 – no question about 
that. We are witnessing a serious and dangerous attempt to dissuade the 
Ukrainian people from taking up new opportunities and the international 
community from helping to defend their freedom of choice. The belief that 
military force, economic coercion and destabilising antics will force or even 
convince us to drop our policies, values and principles, and accept the logic 
of the spheres of influence, expose ones fear for democratic development. /…/ 
The people of Ukraine, its independence and sovereignty should not become 
victims of geopolitical zero-sum games. This is not how politics is conducted 
in the 21st century.” 
 (Füle 25. April 2014) 
 
“And these very days we have been sparing no effort to address what I believe 
is the biggest threat to Europe’s stability and security since the fall of the 
Berlin Wall: the situation in Ukraine. The current events started with the 
people of Ukraine expressing a clear wish to take their future into their own 
hands and come closer to the EU though an agreement which would give  
them political association and economic integration. Unfortunately. Instead 
of accepting the sovereign choices of Ukraine, Russia decided to interfere, to 
destabilize, and to occupy part of the territory of a neighbouring country in a 
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gesture that we hoped was long buried in history books. /…/ It is not just an 
issue for Europe, the US or the G7 group. It should concern the rest of the 
world as well, as it is a direct threat to international law and to international 
peace”  
(Barroso 1. May 2014) 
 
“The very essence of the problem was that Russia did not accept the sovereign 
choices of an independent neighbouring country because it had other designs 
for it. It resorted first to political and economic bullying, and then to outright 
aggression. We could simply not accept this behaviour. This would mean the 
explicit return of spheres of influence or limited sovereignty to the European 
continent.”  
(Barroso 21. September 2014)  
 
From the examples above, the following can be deduced. The events in Eastern 
Ukraine are compared to the WWII and the direct party responsible for them is seen to be 
Russia. The events are viewed as a grave threat to security and peace in not only Europe 
but the entire world. Ukraine is shown as the casualty of Russia’s actions while Russia is 
seen as aggressive and out for its own personal agenda stopping at nothing to achieve its 
geopolitical goals. Thus Russia is painted as disrespecting international laws, a 
destabilizer and a very strong negative ‘other’ to the EU. Meanwhile the EU is shown as 
to take a stand against this unacceptable behaviour and as a protector of peace, stability, 
international law and the interests of the Ukrainian people.  
Within this armed conflict Van Rompuy states that “the Ukrainian government has 
an obligation and a duty to restore order within its borders” thus being recognized as 
having legitimacy to use force – “Ukraine has the right to defend its territorial integrity.” 
(Ashton 6. May 2014, Barroso 12. September 2014). To the EU there is “no doubt that 
the armed fighters are terrorising and disrupting /…/ and are enjoying external support”. 
“Russia bears primary responsibility”. (Van Rompuy 14. June 2014) Cease-fires that 
have been set to place are respected by Ukrainian authorities but have not ended the 
military hostilities, meaning that it is the rebels’ side who fails to keep them. (Van 
Rompuy 27. June 2014) 
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Regardless of Russia’s actions, the EU kept the line that it isn’t too late for Russia to 
co-operate and that all measures adopted by the EU (notably the sanctions and 
restrictions) are reversible and scalable. Thus the EU’s message to Russia was “to engage, 
to implement its part of the Geneva statement, to repeal the mandate of the Federation 
Council to use force on Ukrainian soil and to act as a responsible stakeholder or our 
community of nations.” (Barroso 13. May 2014) “Russia needs to choose if it wants to be 
a strategic partner or a strategic rival. If Russia chooses the latter path, to be a rival, we 
would all collectively have to take the political, economic and security consequences.” 
(Barroso 12. September 2014) 
As a result of Russia’s actions the EU increased its’ sanctions and restrictions towards 
Russia and adopted “additional restrictive measures targeting sectorial cooperation and 
exchanges with Russian Federation.” In addition a “reassessment of the Russia EU 
bilateral cooperation with a view reducing the level of cooperation” was adopted. The 
aim of these measures is “bringing Russia to the conclusion that it is better to have a 
positive, constructive relation with Ukraine and the EU.” (Barroso 12. September 2014) 
“If the EU had not reacted with firmness, and in close partnership with the United States 
and out G/ partners, what would be at risk would not just be Ukraine’s independence but 
the sustainability and the credibility of a multilateral order based on values, equality and 
the rule of law.” (Barroso 21. September 2014)  
Even though this is what the EU would want, it cannot pursue the important positive 
agenda of increased cooperation and exchanges with Russia “when Crimea is illegally 
annexed, when the Russian Federation supports armed revolt in Eastern Ukraine, when 
the violence unleashed kills innocent civilians. /…/ Russia will find itself increasingly 
isolated by its own actions.” (Barroso & Van Rompuy 29. July 2014)  
 
Official discourse: Conclusions 
 
The events in Ukraine are, by the official discourse, shown in a light that offers 
legitimacy to an EU in crisis. The Maidan protests are clearly linked to European values 
and way of life – stating that these are reasons for which the people of Ukraine came to 
the streets for. Through this the official discourse provides a reason for the existence of 
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the Union. The values on which EU is founded upon are shown as relevant and desirable, 
thus making the Union itself still relevant.  The same theme of legitimizing the Union 
continues as the events in Ukraine escalated. After the annexation of Crimea and with the 
beginning of an armed conflict in Eastern Ukraine, the idea and necessity of a unified 
Europe is shown through linking it to peace and stability in Europe. While Europeans 
themselves may take the values EU stands for and the benefits, such as peace and 
prosperity, it provides for granted, they are seen as relevant and desirable outside of the 
boarders of the Union thus legitimizing the idea and existence of the EU. 
The European Union is depicted through the values it stands for, such as peace, 
democracy and rule of law, and through the benefits it provides, such as economic 
stability and prosperity. European identity is created though a differentiation from Russia, 
thus Russia is depicted as the main, mostly negative, ‘other’. The ‘degree of otherness’ 
did vary and changed as the events in Ukraine unfolded. In the beginning, Russia was 
viewed as both a partner and as someone viewing the Eastern neighbourhood in a dated 
manner – through the logic of spheres of influence. The EU however is shown as ready 
to co-operate with Russia and clarify the true nature of the EaP and AA/DCFTA. While 
not being shown in a fully positive light, Russia is not seen as an opponent. However, the 
annexation of Crimea by Russia drastically changed the way in which Russia is painted 
by the official discourse. From there on Russia became seen as violent and aggressive, 
stopping at nothing to achieve its own interests. As the conflict in Eastern Ukraine gained 
momentum, Russia’s imaging as negative and threatening became even stronger. 
Another often reoccurring aspect of the official discourse is the denial of any 
possibility of the motivation and logic on what Russia insists upon such as the logic of 
spheres of influence and the balance-of-power. For the EU, these notions are dated and 
do not belong in the 21st century but rather to the Cold War era. Russia is seen to be 
conducting geopolitical zero-sum games in the name of its right to have spheres of 
influence in its neighbourhood – the post-soviet states. The EU however is shown to want 
to co-operate towards a win-win solution for both the Union and Russia in their shared 
neighbourhood. 
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Oppositional discourses 
 
Jobbik of Hungary 
 
The Jobbik – Movement for a Better Hungary is, in its own view, a far-right 
principled, conservative and radically patriotic Christian party founded in 2003. Its 
fundamental purpose is protecting Hungarian values and interests. Jobbik is the third 
largest party in Hungary and at the 2014 European parliamentary elections, Jobbik won 
3 seats out of a total of 21 with nearly 15% of the votes.3 The party’s political leadership 
consists of: Gábor Vona (Chairman), Tamás Sneider (vice-president) and Márton 
Gyöngyösi (in charge of foreign affaris). The party is represented in the European 
Parliament by: Béla Kovács, Zoltán Balczó and Krisztina Morvai.4 
Jobbik was chosen as one of the parties for the analysis of the counter-hegemony 
discourses within Europe because, firstly, Jobbik is a far-right anti-EU political party and 
thus expressing a counter-hegemonic discourse could be expected, and secondly, Jobbik 
was one of the few parties to express their views on their website and on social media in 
English. The analysis of the far-right anti-hegemony discourse of the Jobbik party in 
Hungary consists of 24 articles published on their website that make clear representations 
of the Ukrainian events and carry the statements of their political leaders. However due 
to the fact that several of these articles were published without a date, the referencing 
style within this chapter will be a little different. This will also affect the temporal 
differentiation of the evolution of the discourse. However is not of grave concern since 
the material collected is of lesser volume than the material collected for the official 
discourse and similar distinction on a temporal scale cannot be made. It is also important 
to note that, when in the case of the official discourses there were several institutions 
voicing opinions at the same time on the same issues, Jobbik speaks with a single voice. 
Thus one cannot expect to find an equal amount of empirical material. However each 
texts used voices clear self/other and identity dimensions. 
 
                                                          
3Jobbik homepage; http://www.jobbik.com/short_summary_about_jobbik; last accessed: 15.April 2015 
4Jobbik homepage; http://www.jobbik.com/meps; last accessed: 15.April 2015 
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Analysis of the Jobbik discourse 
 
The political leaders of Jobbik express – as was to be expected – a fundamentally 
different view of the events in Ukraine from that of the official discourse of the EU. 
According to Jobbik’s discursive approach the Maidan protests can be attributed to 
Western outside influence – mostly that of the US – to “gain control over the Eurasian 
continent”. The West had been “violating the sovereignty of Ukraine for a long time by 
various means of political arm twisting” and was supporting “an extremist and explicitly 
chauvinistic opposition” in Ukraine. (14) Jobbik’s official position and general view of 
the Ukrainian events can be generalized by the following: 
“What happened in Ukraine was a coup d’état resulting in a regime change 
backed by the west and assisted by the US intelligence service. Let me quote 
Victoria Nuland who admitted that the US spent 5 billion dollars on stirring 
up and escalating the Maidan Square demonstrations and then she dictated a 
list to US ambassador Geoffrey Pyatt with the names the US wants to see in 
the new government of Ukraine.” 
Márton Gyöngyösi (16) 
 
The events in Ukraine are a “geopolitical conflict” in which “Russia and the United 
States are waging a half cold, half hot war.” (1) The Jobbik rhetoric sees a “geopolitical 
game behind the Ukrainian armed conflict” (7) between United States and Russia. This 
is not to “necessarily mean an EU-Russia or a NATO-Russia conflict.”(7) “The war in 
Ukraine isn’t even fought by Russia and the Ukraine, it’s just the political game of the 
great powers.” (15) 
All in all the discourse portrays US as the main culprit and negative other (much 
unlike the official discourse). The American elite is accused of having “lost their sense 
of reality” and of trying to “Americanize the whole world”.(12) To Jobbik’s US is “the 
worlds’ only current superpower” (12) which has its foreign policy influenced by 
“Neoconservatives, whose zeal to implement a monopolar world order puts any religious 
fanatic into shame”.(12) “The violent expansion and monopoly of the liberal political, 
economic and cultural value system of the United States” is summed up by the phrase 
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“Neocon Jihad”, which is fought not only with weapons, but though “covert means” such 
as “waving the banners of liberty and democracy”, “placing the nation under the yoke of 
a loyal political elite”, “the propaganda machine of western media” and “breaking the 
backbone of the county’s economy.” (12) This is exactly what is seen to be taking place 
in Ukraine right now. The overall geopolitical interest of the US is seen to be the desire 
“to reach as far as the Russian border by annexing, or to use the politically correct term, 
by "integrating" the entire territory of Ukraine.” (20) 
When in the official discourse the ties and co-operations between the EU and US 
are seen as a positive thing and a strength, the Jobbik discourse sees it as a bad thing 
through which the US imposes influence over the European nations. The US foreign 
policy is seen as trying to “turn Russia against the EU”. (2) The whole situation is 
described to be orchestrated by and only in the interests of the US. This view can be 
illustrated by: 
“The destruction and market loss of companies producing goods for and the 
industries depending upon the Russian market as well as the enfeeblement of 
the multi-polar diplomacy of the EU countries serve but one interest: that of 
the United States of America. There is no European country that could profit 
from a conflict potentially instigated by the USA.” (5) 
“The only party to benefit from the further intensification of the Russia-
Ukraine crisis is the USA, since they could weaken Europe and Russia at the 
same time.” (12) 
The EU is depicted as “an institutionalized and bureaucratic structure used for the 
total economic deprivation and colonization of our country and the whole region” (12) 
with leaders who have “mostly been passive observers of the ongoing events.” (17) The 
EU is used by the West to achieve its’ own goals and ambitions as illustrated by: 
“Ukrainian crisis revealed Brussels' lack of an independent foreign policy 
agenda and how exposed the EU was to the United States in terms of security, 
since the US treats our continent as a "geostrategic base.” (20) 
The reason for the “dumb and self-destructive” behaviour of the European leaders, 
Gyöngyösi believes, is that “the US blackmails the European elite” with the collected 
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date from wire-taps that were used on its allies. (12) It is also seen irresponsible to offer 
Ukraine “the hope of EU and NATO membership.” (12) Jobbik, similarly to the official 
discourse, rejects the zero-sum logic stating that: “the choice between East and West must 
not be an ‘either-or’ issue /…/ it must be based on an ‘East-AND-West approach.”(16) 
But it is the West in this regard making Ukraine choose between itself and Russia. 
The West is accused of “indifference”, “double standards” and of “conspiratorial 
silence” towards the aggression showed by the Ukrainian army and the mass graves found 
in Donetsk. (6) The West is also called “hypocritical to present Russia, who has been 
holding back in spite of their fears for the Russian minority in Ukraine, as the main 
culprit.” (8) 
NATO has adopted an “openly anti-Russian policy” (11) and its actions in the 
Eastern European region are seen as a provocation and thus a justification for Russia’s 
foreign policy. NATO’s “irresponsible, aggressive and provocative policies have 
brought on the Ukrainian crisis” and NATO is seen to “keep intensifying the conflict with 
Russia /…/ all in an effort to promote US geopolitical interests.”(11) “NATO, the 
military-defence dimension of Euro-Atlantism, has degraded Hungary and the whole of 
Central-Eastern Europe into a toll of Western, and especially American geopolitical 
interests.”(13)  
Ukraine, or more its’ government is also shown in a negative light. As previously 
mentioned, the Ukrainian crisis is depicted as Western orchestrated. Ukraine itself is 
described as having been a highly unstable state ever since its establishment – “a time 
bomb ticking away”. (12) The current crisis in Ukraine is linked to the Orange revolution 
of 2004-2005. The latter is also seen as “dress rehearsal” for the West of the events going 
on right now. (12) The removal of Yanukovych from power is called a “Coup d’état” that 
was helped to be executed by the “financial, media and intelligence support of the west” 
for the crime of “refusing to sign the EU Association Agreement designed to colonize his 
homeland.” (12) 
Jobbik considers the Ukrainian government “illegitimate” (8), “chauvinistic”, 
“anti-Russian” and “anti-minority”.”(9) The government is seen as to “incite hatred 
among its own people, destroying and devastating everything in the interests of securing 
its own hold on power” (17) The illegitimacy of the government is seen to arise from two 
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aspects. First, by the previously mentioned opinion of the government being placed to 
power by a US orchestrated coup. The second aspect from which the illegitimacy of the 
government rises is the use of military forces in the Eastern Ukraine.  
“By attacking its own citizens with armed forces, the Kiev Government has 
forfeited the trust and loyalty of the local Russian community with Ukrainian 
citizenship. /…/ Kiev has violated the fundamental rules of democracy by 
waging war on its own citizens.”(4) 
Within this discursive framework the aggressor isn’t Russia but the Ukrainian 
government, who has begun a war against its own people and the West, with its’ 
“aggressive and irresponsible Euro-Atlantic war policy.” (10) Jobbik considers the 
separatist forces fighting in the Eastern Ukraine “rebel forces fighting for their freedom” 
and thus they are referred to as “freedom fighters.”(17) The people fighting in Donetsk 
and Lugansk are “dedicated patriots and freedom fighters, who confronted the aggression 
of the Ukrainian central power” and not terrorists. (20) In addition to the accusation of 
“unjustified aggression” the Ukrainian leaders are also accused with mass graves being 
found on the areas taken over from them by the separatists, raising “suspicion of crimes 
against humanity similar to the ones committed in the Balkan wars in the 1990s” (6) and 
thus accused of genocide.(10)  
Russia meanwhile is depicted more positively – as an “atomic power”, “an example 
of enforcing one’s own interests” and as “an ally”. (9) Russia is seen as “calm and 
responsible” (20) with only acting in “response to Western provocations.” (12) Russia’s’ 
foreign policy though the eyes of Jobbik is shown by the following: 
“Ever since the cold war, all they’d been asking for is to have a security zone 
(from the aspect of Russian security), which is free of CIA and NATO activity. 
/…/ what Russia obviously sees is that the West has aggressively penetrated 
its sphere of influence and is expanding there, overruling agreements made 
at the end of the cold war.”(16) 
The latter statement justifies Russia’s policy of spheres of influence while the West 
having spheres of influence is depicted negatively. Russia having a sphere of influence is 
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accepted and normalized, while the West expanding its own is not. The latter is illustrated 
by the following example: 
 “Russia obviously sees is that the West has aggressively penetrated its sphere 
of influence and is expanding there.” (16) 
Regarding the annexation of Crimea Jobbiks leader Gyöngyösi stated that “Russia 
was helping her own ethnic minority since the Crimean peninsula is predominantly 
populated by Russians.”(3)  Russia is seen as a protector of minority rights and a great 
example and an ally in that department. “Russia is fighting for the rights of ethnic 
minorities living in Ukraine, so they also keep the rights of the Hungarian minority of the 
Lower Carpathians on the agenda.”(3) Russia’s actions in Ukraine are understood and 
defended: 
“As soon as the forces that had overthrown Viktor Yanukovych with Western 
assistance came into power, they immediately began voicing chauvinistic, 
anti-Russian, anti-minority and anti-Hungarian opinions; no wonder that 
Russia intervened in order to protect the Russian-speaking community.”(9) 
In response to the statements, also voiced by the official discourse, regarding 
Russia’s military involvement in Eastern Ukraine Gyöngyösi finds them “absurd 
allegations” by the NATO, who “cannot present credible evidence.”(5) In the eyes of 
Jobbik, it is the US, who has military personnel fighting in Ukraine: “thousands of 
mercenaries organized by the American Blackwater/Academi Company are fighting 
under Ukrainian banners”. (12) So it would appear that it is a “pot calling the kettle 
black” type of situation. 
Jobbik’s discourse also, similarly to the official one, notes the importance of 
information in today’s world. However when EU official discourse accused Russia of 
supporting the separatists with propagandist measures, Jobbik accuses the western media 
of silencing issues not supporting the Western presentation of events (10) and calls the 
western media “unilateral, anti-Russian”(12) and a “propaganda machine”(12). 
Jobbik also takes a drastically different view regarding the Crimean referendum: 
“Jobbik considers the Crimean vote as a triumph of a community’s self-determination. 
/…/ referendum was legitimate and valid, even though both the Ukrainian government 
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and Russia exercised some pressure on the voting. /…/ the numbers spoke for themselves: 
nearly all local citizens want to belong to Russia. The West only stands for the self-
determination of a community it is in the interest of the West.”(3) As an example of the 
last statement Kosovo is often used: “It was double standards if Crimea was not allowed 
to have the self-government that Kosovo had been granted.”(14) Thus the following 
position is adopted: 
“If we respect the values of democracy, we cannot apply any double 
standards. Respecting democracy, people’s decisions and their right for self-
governance in certain cases but not others is an odd and questionable 
practice.” (16)  
The same attitude is adopted regarding the referendums hosted in the Donetsk and 
Lugansk area during the armed conflict in the Eastern region of Ukraine. “Jobbik 
Movement for a Better Hungary respects the elections held in the Donetsk and Lugansk 
Oblast as well as their outcome, even though the circumstances of voting were not ideal 
due to the armed conflict that had been going on for half a year. /…/ basic requirement 
of democracy was met, i.e that citizens must be allowed to make an independent decision 
about their own future.” (4)  
Another very different viewpoint between the official and the Jobbik discourse is 
the understanding of the territorial integrity of Ukraine. While the official discourse 
maintains the position of Ukraine being a sovereign country that’s territorial integrity 
must be respected, Jobbik states, that: “The Ukrainian government itself has been 
detrimental to the unity of its own country. Any government using its armed forced to 
attack its own citizens loses its legitimacy, thus condemning the country to an inevitable 
disintegration.”(10) And thus the territorial integrity of Ukraine is “nothing but an 
illusion.”(20) 
Although these two discourses previously described are very different in their views 
they share quite a few policies. Just as the official discourse the Jobbik discourse calls for 
the need to resolve the situation with talk, to conduct investigations over the crimes 
committed in Ukraine and decentralization. However Jobbik also calls for a federal 
Ukraine: 
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“Firstly, we need to sit down and talk about the situation /…/ An impartial 
investigation of the tragedies of the past year should be conducted and 
responsibility should be taken by alles sides for their wrongdoings /…/ At this 
point in time also decentralization, federalization of Ukraine should be 
considered.” (13) 
However the opinion on policy matters differs between the discourses in regards 
the sanctions towards Russia. As in Jobbiks’ discourse the EU stands nothing to gain from 
damaged relations with Russia and stands to lose economically from the sanctions 
adopted. Meanwhile the US wins. (5) In addition Jobbik states that: “anti-Russia 
sanctions were not the appropriate measures in terms of solving the Ukrainian crisis.” 
(19) 
The Hungarian minority of “150 thousand Hungarians in the Lower Carpathians” 
in Ukraine is the centre of Jobbiks’ policy concerns. It is both the reason for which Jobbik 
is so strongly invested in the Ukrainian crisis and its protection is also the policy priority 
for Jobbik and the “aspects of cooperation with the EU and the economy can only come 
second”. (18) 
 
British National Party 
 
The second source for counter-hegemony discourses in Europe is a UK based far-
right political party The British National Party (BNP). Politically BNP sees itself as a 
nationalist party promoting the interests of the people.5 It opposes migration to the UK 
and is conservative in its views. The party has become a rather marginal political force in 
the recent years having experienced very little electoral success. Never the less the party 
discourse was selected for analysis due to its close ties to the Jobbik movement and the 
radically different discourse and the radically divergent construction of events in Ukraine 
it embodies from that of the official discourse. BNP discourse is characterized by an 
emotional rhetoric that carries with it strong judgements and calls for actions. The 
analysis of the BNP discourse consists of the reading of 27 texts (mostly articles) 
                                                          
5 http://www.bnp.org.uk/introduction-0  
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published and found on their website. These texts were scanned to make clear us vs them 
identifications and provide obvious assessments of the situation in Ukraine. 
 
Analysis of the British National Party disourse 
 
Similarly to Jobbik, the BNP sees the events in Ukraine as orchestrated by the use 
of foreign funds and intelligence, mainly the US, to advance the interests of the western 
elites. However, differently from Jobbik, the BNP is much more critical as to the 
motivators for this. The main beneficiaries of the Maidan and the subsequent events are 
named to be the globalist elites who are trying to create a new world order. This new 
world order would be a totalitarian one world government with the population serving the 
elites as slaves. The globalist elites are seen to both hate and fear Putin who is depicted 
as the only man that they can’t beat, who can see through their agenda and who stand for 
the sovereignty of Russia. Due to this the globalist elite is using Ukraine to weaken Russia 
(2).  
In this light Putin is shown as a hero, a saviour, a protector (1) who cares for his 
people. Putin is characterised as being wise, strong, steady, cautious and assured in trying 
to protect his people. (5; 12) All in all he is seen as a positive role model. The US president 
is at the same time referred to by his middle name – Hussein – (10) (11) which is an 
attempt to link him to the Muslim world and make him appear more negative. 
As previously mentioned, the BNP sees the Maidan protests as organised by foreign 
elites, especially the US, to achieve their own goals. The Maidan events are not seen as a 
popular peoples uprising (13) – we in the west have been fed the usual neo-con rubbish 
that the Ukrainian people are fighting for freedom, democracy and human rights (3)– but 
as orchestrated and led by foreign forces to oppose Russia. The motivation seen behind 
US policy of organizing and supporting Maidan is its desire to weaken Russia and oppose 
Putin. Those people, who sincerely wished for changes in Ukraine are used by the foreign 
forces to achieve their own means. (2) (3) The Maidan uprising is portrayed as a military 
operation that is well organized and the Maidan square is compared to a war scene: /…/ 
The centre of Kiev resembles a front. This is an area which is completely outside the 
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jurisdiction of the state. /…/ (2) The removal of Yanukovych from power is, as in the 
Jobbik discourse, seen as a coup and illegal. (6) 
Regarding the annexation of Crimea, the BNP discourse declares that Russia did 
not invade Ukraine but had every right to protect its interests and assets. (6) Russia is 
even referred to as Mother Country for Ukraine (3) and Crimea simply as being given 
away by an incompetent Nikita Khrushchev to Ukraine as a gift (7). The self-declaration 
of Crimea is, once again, compared to Kosovo, and the western leaders are seen to be 
hypocrites (7). In February 2014, before the annexation of Crimea and before the 
beginning of the fighting in Eastern Ukraine, the BNP, remarks the high possibility of 
Ukraine splitting up. /…/ already it looks likely that the Russian parts of the Ukraine in 
the south and in the east will merge back into the Mother Country. /…/ (3)  
The conflict in Eastern Ukraine is viewed as a civil war. Unlike of the official 
discourse, which doesn’t mention war in the least bit but uses wording like crisis or 
conflict instead. This civil war is fought by the Ukrainian illegitimate government against 
its own people to achieve the interests of the US. While in the eyes of the official 
discourse, the Ukrainian government’s actions in the eastern part of Ukraine are an 
attempt to restore order and law in the region and defend its unity. Thus the official 
discourse depicts the people involved in the military actions in the region as separatists, 
both oppositional discourses name them as freedom fighters or – especially in the case of 
BNP – self-defence groups (17). 
The downing of flight MH17 is fully blamed on the western governments, who in 
their organized the coup in Ukraine in the first place. This coup allowed the rise to power 
of the current government which, by its actions against the Russian minority, created the 
civil war. BNP plays with the identity of the culprit who actually shot the plain down. 
The reader is lead to believe that BNP is giving objective facts by depicting that both the 
Ukrainian military forces and the rebels might be at fault. However the reader is pushed 
more towards blaming the official government forces for the action with statements like: 
/…/it is very unlikely that their6pinned down and retreating bands would have had had 
the opportunity to capture such and advanced system./…/ Regardless of this, the plain 
                                                          
6 Here meant: the ethnic Russian rebels 
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being shot down by the separatist would have been a tragic case of mistaken identity, 
while the official forces would have shot the plane down due to incompetence. (19) 
The main other to which BNP contrasts itself is the globalist elites / Zionists / neo-
conservatives (similarly to Jobbik) who are mainly operating on the international politics 
arena through the US. So while Russia is seen as a positive other, the US is depicted as 
the main negative other carrying though the policy agenda of the negative elites. The 
discourse depicts the US and Russia as opponents due to the activities of the first. Russia 
is seen as simply reacting to the actions of the US to defend its own interests. Meanwhile 
Russia is portrayed as wise and prudent, contrasting the rashness and interference of the 
US and European governments supporting the violence. (4)  
The exact reasoning of the motivation behind these US policies changes though 
time. In the beginning of the Ukrainian crisis and during the Maidan uprising, the US was 
simply seen as trying to oppose Putin and Russia. As the events in Ukraine escalated 
towards an armed conflict in the Eastern Ukraine however the main goal of the US 
policies was seen as to start a WWIII in order to support the ailing banking system of the 
west. (9; 18) Thus the US is labelled a warmonger along with the EU and NATO and 
their leaders (16; 19) and the current situation in Ukraine is often compared to year 1914 
(19) – the time when WWI began.  War in Ukraine could easily become war in Europe, 
war in Europe could too easily become World War Three. (20; 21) To take the view of 
the West trying to start WWIII even further, claims are made towards its intentions to 
start a first-strike nuclear war against Russia and China (25). Thus the west is painted in 
irresponsible, selfish and aggressive colours. 
While not opposing the EU in particular, the Union is still regarded in a strongly 
negative light. The EU is seen as Marxist (1) and an imperialist empire builder (19), 
immoral (4), corrupt (8; 12), weak and short-sighted (9). Once free governments tow the 
fascist totalitarian line of the lunatics in Brussels. Not one European political leader is 
prepared to stand up and say he EU is the totalitarian monster that it is. (9) In this sense 
the BNP is much more EU critical than Jobbik was, which generally saw the EU as used 
and manipulated by the EU. Similarly to Jobbik, EU enlargement is not seen positively, 
but as an imperialis expansionism meant to gain more opportunities and money for the 
multinationals and the rich. (20, 24, 27) 
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BNP discourse has little positive to say about the new Ukrainian government – it is 
seen as a sham, a puppet for the west, as ultra-xenophobic fascists neo-conservative 
tyranny (8; 9). The elected president Poroshenko being called a chocolate billionaire in a 
clear reference to the eccentric (one might even say crazy) fictional character Willy 
Wonka. (17; 18) As the conflict in Eastern Ukraine emerged the criticism directed at the 
Ukrainian government became harsher. Ukraine, similarly to Jobbik discourse, is 
depicted as the aggressor. However in BNP discourse this is done in a much more radical 
way. For example: Ukraine lunatic government of total freaks attack own people with 
tanks and aircraft. (9) The new government is called murders on several occasions (11; 
15; 17).  
Policy wise, the BNP is most worried about Britain being dragged into another war 
and is threatened by the US foreign policy in Europe. It is through these aspects that the 
BNP rationalises its addressing of the Ukrainian crisis. Arising from this the BNP 
discourse asks for the EU (and the US) to withdraw from Ukraine, to stop supplying arms 
and money and to start promoting a peaceful dialogue. (22) Each of these policy proposals 
is exactly the same as those presented by the official discourse to the Russian Federation 
just vice versa – what the official discourse asks of Russia, the oppositional discourses 
ask from the EU.  
 
Counter-hegemony discourses Conclusion 
 
The two parties chosen to represent counter-hegemonic discourses within the EU 
were, as was expected in the beginning of this research, radically different in their 
discursive representation of the Ukrainian events from the official discourse. Also, as was 
expected, these discourses were rather similar in their construction of the self-other 
dimensions in light of the Ukrainian crisis. However, though in general rather similar, the 
BNP expressed a much more radical discursive approach to the Ukrainian conflict than 
Jobbik. This even more extreme radicalism might be one of the reasons behind the lack 
of support for the party. 
Both parties viewed the Maidan protests as, not so much about European values and 
aspirations, and more as a US orchestrated yet another coloured revolution, which 
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ultimately lead to a coup. Both parties also name the forces behind the US foreign policies 
neoconservatives but the BNP also adds Zionists and globalist elites as influencing the 
events in Ukraine. Jobbik sees the motivation behind Ukrainian crisis as West’s desire to 
oppose Russia and achieve the US geopolitical interests in the region. Meanwhile BNP 
sees the reasoning behind the Ukrainian events as the desire of the US to start a WWIII 
in order to save the ailing banking system.  
All in all both parties see the conflict in Ukraine as a war, unlike the official 
discourse, which references to the events as a crisis or a conflict. Similarly, both parties 
view this war as illegal and illegitimate – the Ukrainian government is seen to be killing 
its own people. Neither party has much positive to say about the Ukrainian government – 
naming it an illegitimate puppet of the west out to persecute its own minorities. It is 
Ukraine that is seen as the aggressor in the situation. The people fighting in Eastern 
Ukraine are called either freedom fighters, self-defence groups or rebels.  
Arising from this, Russia and Putin are both depicted in positive colours. Russia is 
seen as defending its interests in Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea is seen as Russia’s 
legitimate right to protect its people from oppressive governments. Russia’s president 
Vladimir Putin is seen as a role model and an example of leadership to aspire towards. 
He is depicted as strong, powerful and calculating. In addition neither of the counter-
hegemonic discourses rejects the logic of spheres of influence and view it as something 
to which Russia has deserved. It is seen as a positive that Russia is defending its interests 
and its right to have spheres of influence in Eastern Europe, while the west is seen as 
invading and ever expanding.  
The main negative ‘other’ for the counter-hegemonic discourses is the USA – 
whether it be led by Zionist or neoconservatives. The US is seen as to manipulate and use 
the events in Ukraine in its own favour to oppose Russia. The EU however follows suit 
and is dependent on US foreign policies. The Union is painted as bureaucratic and 
imperialistic – always trying to expand and colonize sovereign countries in Europe. It is 
the EU that is seen as interfering in Ukraine. Neither of the parties views EU in a positive 
light, however the BNP is much more negative towards the EU seeing it as a totalitarian 
fascist monster. 
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Conclusion 
 
The main goal of this thesis was to create understanding on how the EU sees the 
events in Ukraine and creates itself through the articulation of a self and other. This 
official discourse, articulated through the readings of EU political elite, are seen as 
hegemonic. Discourses radically opposing the official discourses – viewed as counter-
hegemonic discourses – were analysed to see how these views are challenged by political 
parties carrying an anti-European theme.  
To achieve the aim set above a poststructuralist approach to discourse, language 
and identity was adopted. The theoretical framework was based on the works of Lene 
Hansen, Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe. The analysis of the hegemonic discourse 
was conducted through a creation of a timeline around key events – the beginning of 
protests of Maidan, the annexation of Crimea and the outset of violent clashes in the 
Eastern Ukraine.  
The results of the analysis show that by the official discourse, the events in Ukraine 
are depicted in a way as to offer legitimacy for the EU. The Maidan protests and events 
that followed it are portrayed as to have risen from the desire of the Ukrainian people for 
the values of the EU and aspirations for a European way of life. Thus, even though much 
of what the Union stands for might be taken for granted within the populace of the 
member states, the values and principles underpinning the European identity are still 
relevant today and desired outside the Union.  
On a different aspect, as the events in Ukraine gained momentum, they also became 
seen as threat to the very idea of Europe. This was especially the case with the annexation 
of Crimea and it bringing back painful memories of WWII. The EU was created as a 
peace project and thus conflict right at the boarders of the Union is not only a security 
threat but a challenge to the values and ideas underpinning the European identity. It is for 
these reasons that the Union was determined to take decisive action against the outside 
threat. 
Within the official discourse, the identity of the EU is created through a linking to 
the values underpinning the Union and though a differentiation from Russia. What is 
important to note here is, that through the adoption of a timeline established by key events, 
some changes in the official discourse can be seen. One of these changes is the rise in the 
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degree of otherness of Russia. In the beginning of the Maidan protests Russia was seens 
as a strategic partner simply approaching Ukraine with a zero-sum view – an obstacle 
which could be passed.  
However this changed with the annexation of Crimea. While Europe was seen to 
stand for peace and wide spread prosperity and stability, Russia is seen as aggressive, 
self-interested and not respective of international laws. The official discourse depicts 
Russia as being stuck in the outdated Cold War mentality of bloc against bloc and the 
logic of spheres of influence thus opposing itself to the Union as a rival. It is precisely 
this world view that is strongly rejected by the official discourse. Instead cooperation, 
mutual benefit and dialogue are seen as the desirable and modern way of conducting 
politics. 
As for the counter-hegemonic discourses, as was to be expected, both were very 
similar in the way in which they viewed Europe, Russia and the events in Ukraine. The 
events in Maidan are not linked to a general desire of the Ukrainian people for European 
values and way of life. Instead they are seen as orchestrated by the US to achieve its own 
geopolitical goals. Thus, unlike from the official discourse, both counter-hegemonic 
discourses saw the US as the negative other and as the greatest threat, instead of Russia. 
The US is depicted as a geopolitical player out to thwart Russia.  
However the discourses do differ on the exact motivation and drive behind US 
foreign policy. For the Jobbik discourse, the US is led by neoconservatives who wish to 
destabilize Russia and gain even more control over the world. BNP is more radical in the 
sense that the US is viewed as wanting to start WWIII by instigating conflict in Ukraine 
in order to save its ailing banking system.  
Neither of the two political parties has much good to say about the EU. Both view 
the Union as an imperialistic colonizer, always interfering in sovereign states. The EU is 
shown as doing the bidding of the US in all matter and having little if any foreign policy 
of its own. Here again the BNP discourse is more radical and critical towards the Union, 
labelling it a fascist monster.  
Russia, the main ‘other’ of the official discourse, is seen by the counter-hegemonic 
discourses as a protector of minorities and its own interested. Russia is not seen as an 
aggressor but as simply reacting to the provocations of the West. In the same light, the 
Crimean annexation is not seen as illegal but as a natural progress of events. Russia’s 
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president Vladimir Putin is seen as a great role model for the European leaders. He is seen 
strong, decisive, calm and calculative. Meanwhile Ukraine and especially its new 
government is depicted as an aggressor waging an illegal war against its own people for 
the benefit of the US. 
As was expected, the official discourse differs radically from the discourses 
expressed by the two chosen far-right political parties thus making them counter-
hegemonic. The analysis of these discourses shows that the counter-hegemonic 
discourses do try to offer a radically different meaning to the idea of Europe and to the 
events in Ukraine (and how they are linked). The findings of the comparative analysis 
conducted suggests that the deep splits in the EU identity construction stretch far beyond 
the discourses emanated from the two parties and key speakers of the EU.  The findings 
are illustrative of deep splits within the European identity, which in current times is faced 
with many challenges both from within and out. The events in Ukraine are just one of the 
catalysts and evidence of such rifts.   
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